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LOCHNER, LAWRENCE, AND LIBERTY 
Joseph F. Morrissey∗ 
“It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of 
the laws of this [regulatory] character, while passed under what 
is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting 
the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed [for] other 
motives.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Many of the states of the United States have statutes, constitutional 
provisions, and court decisions that deny individuals the right to have 
a family, specifically a spouse and children, based on sexual 
orientation. Advocates have made a wide variety of arguments 
attacking such restrictions.2 Scholars and litigants frequently argue 
that such acts violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection or 
invade a constitutional right to privacy.3 However, such arguments 
are often defeated by counter arguments presented with religious, 
moral, and even emotional fervor.  
This article presents and defends a new analytical framework 
based on liberty of contract to advance gay4 rights. While the 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., Princeton University, 
1989; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1993. For their thoughtful feedback and support, thanks 
are due to many colleagues and friends, including Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and Professor David Mayer 
(both of whose work, in part, inspired this piece and both of whom were thoughtful enough to give me 
feedback on this work), Deans Darby Dickerson and Jamie Fox of Stetson University College of Law 
for their support, and my friends and colleagues Professors Mike Allen, Brannon Denning, Christopher 
Leslie, and Robert Wintemute for their support and comments on earlier drafts. In addition, thanks are 
due to the organizers of the Fourth Annual Critical Race Studies Symposium at UCLA for inviting me to 
present this article at their symposium in March 2010. 
 1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
 2. See infra Part I.A–C. 
 3. One trial court has even reasoned that one such piece of legislation is an impermissible bill of 
attainder and that it violates the separation of powers doctrine. See In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 
5070056, at *22–25 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008) (finding a legislative ban on gay adoption violative of 
the separation of powers doctrine). 
 4. The term “gay” is used throughout this article expansively to include all people who are in, are 
pursuing, or are inclined toward same gender intimate relationships, thus including gay men, lesbian 
women, and people who might otherwise be referred to as bisexual. The term is used expansively 
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framework is applied here contextually to the area of gay rights, the 
framework should also be applicable to a panoply of regulations that 
affect private orderings—from regulations directly affecting 
economic relations to those affecting marijuana, gambling, or 
prostitution, just to name a few examples.5 
This alternative analytical framework is more neutral and less 
emotional than either the pleas for equal protection or privacy that 
advocates of gay rights advance or the religious fervor with which 
some opponents respond to those pleas. The framework is based on 
the neutral economic principles embodied in historic notions of 
liberty of contract.   
Those principles were prevalent during what has become known as 
the Lochner era, an era named for the infamous case of Lochner v. 
New York, quoted at the beginning of this article. The Lochner case 
and the era named for it were dominated by a simple presumption 
that people should be allowed the liberty to order their own affairs 
through contract and that regulatory encroachments on that liberty 
interest should be evaluated critically. This article will argue that it is 
with just such a presumption that restrictions denying individuals the 
liberty to pursue and have a family should be evaluated and, most 
likely, found to be unconstitutional. 
The framework presented and defended here acknowledges that the 
Lochnerian analysis of legislation is overly simplistic. Therefore, a 
modified version of that analysis is advanced. Under this modified 
Lochnerian analysis, based on the presumption that people should be 
allowed the liberty to order their own affairs, three questions must be 
asked when evaluating whether a court should uphold a regulation. 
The first question is whether a liberty of contract interest is 
implicated. If not, this framework will not apply. In most situations 
involving economic arrangements, it is clear that private contractual 
orderings are involved. Lochner itself addressed regulations on 
                                                                                                                 
because of the difficulty of exactly categorizing people as specifically or only homosexual in their 
inclination. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
353 (2000) (discussing the paradox of gay nomenclature and the difficulties presented by attempts to 
categorize people as definitely or only of one sexual orientation). 
 5. Application of the framework to other contexts, however, will be left for subsequent articles. 
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employment arrangements. In that context, there are contracts 
between employer and employee. Moreover, even in situations that 
are not clearly or primarily economic in nature, if there is a private 
ordering, the answer to this foundational question will typically be 
yes. In the areas of marriage, adoption, and surrogacy (probed in 
more depth in this article), contracts dictate each arrangement, even if 
the government is involved. Thus, liberty of contract is implicated 
even in those social orderings. 
The second question then is whether the regulation in question 
goes too far in trumping the liberty of contract interest of the parties 
involved. This involves a balancing test. Is the interest advanced by 
the government sufficient to outweigh the liberty of contract interest 
implicated? With the presumption running in favor of the liberty 
interest, the government must have strong reasons why the liberty 
interest can be burdened. This analysis will not foreclose the ability 
of the government to regulate in areas that impinge on the liberty of 
contract but will simply ensure that the burden on that liberty interest 
is warranted by a legitimate and compelling government interest. As 
this article will explore, morality alone should not be a sufficient 
reason.6 Typical areas deemed to be within the police powers of the 
state, namely the health and welfare of individuals, could provide 
sufficient reasons to legitimately regulate even if a liberty of contract 
interest is burdened.  
The final question that the framework presented here asks is 
whether the regulation is designed to counter a significant structural 
or procedural defect in the contracts subject to the regulation in 
question. If so, the presumption in favor of the liberty of contract 
interest should shift in favor of the regulation. In these cases, the 
regulation is more likely than not to be warranted and appropriate, 
allowing the parties involved to better achieve outcomes that would 
be achieved if the defects to contracting in that context did not exist. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. The Supreme Court made this principle clear in Lawrence v. Texas when Justice Kennedy cited 
to Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick: “[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice . . . .” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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Further, where there are structural or procedural defects in the 
contracts that are the subject of regulation, the very notion of a liberty 
interest in protecting those contracts is illusory and indeed 
oxymoronic. There is no genuine liberty interest involved in entering 
into a contract when the structure or procedure involved with that 
contract is flawed, one where either party is subject to duress, for 
example, or where one of the parties is likely to be fraudulently 
induced into the bargain. Thus, in areas where there seems to be a 
risk of inherent unfairness in bargaining, ex ante regulations that 
impinge on the liberty of contract should be acceptable.  
As this article further develops below, the Lochner case itself 
provides a good example of this type of situation. If a court were to 
determine that the employees of bakeries in 1905 had little or no 
bargaining ability with their employers, then government intervention 
to set fair employment conditions between those parties—conditions 
that might be achieved if the bargaining process was fair—likely 
would be warranted and appropriate. In such a case under this new 
framework, the presumption should be in favor of the regulation. 
The context explored in this article for this new paradigm is the 
area of gay rights to family. Thus, this article will begin in Part I by 
presenting a survey of the primary encroachments on the liberty of 
gay people to enter into formal arrangements to create a family.7  
Part II of this article will discuss the Lochner decision and develop 
its potential for renewed application. Part II will also discuss the 
philosophy and history that led up to that decision and certain other 
decisions from that era. Finally, Part II will present critical analyses 
of the downfall of Lochner and its analytical framework. The goal of 
this part is to explain the meaning of the Lochnerian liberty of 
contract interest. 
Part III will explain that many of the traditional criticisms of 
Lochner are unfounded and are currently being re-considered by 
scholars. Part III will admit to certain shortcomings of the traditional 
                                                                                                                 
 7. The ability of all people to create informal families is acknowledged and respected, and this 
article in no way intends to diminish the significance and power of those relationships. In addition, Part I 
will survey the primary challenges that have been made to those restrictions and the successes and 
failures of those arguments. 
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Lochner framework but will set forth more fully the modification to 
that framework outlined briefly above, making the framework more 
balanced and appropriate for use by modern courts. Part III will then 
apply that approach to gay rights to family, hypothesizing the results 
in each of the three main areas under inquiry here: rights to marry, 
adopt, and enter into surrogacy arrangements. 
Finally, this article will conclude in part with a summary of what 
has been considered. It will then make some final remarks about the 
potential usefulness of a modified Lochnerian approach to liberty of 
contract, and thus to liberty itself. 
I.  THE SYSTEMATIC DENIAL OF GAY RIGHTS TO FAMILY 
As much of the case law involving rights to family indicates, the 
Supreme Court has on many occasions expressed the view that the 
Constitution does protect individuals’ basic liberty interest in having 
a family, including raising children. Stretching back to the landmark 
case of Meyer v. Nebraska,8 interestingly a case decided during the 
Lochner era, the basic notion of the liberty interest in having a family 
was spelled out clearly.9 In Meyer, the Court considered and ruled as 
unconstitutional a state statute that mandated that English be the only 
language taught in school.10 The Court did not need to express its 
view with respect to the wide array of liberties protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but it took the occasion to do so, stating that  
[w]ithout doubt . . . [the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
liberty interest] denotes . . . the right of the individual to contract, 
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 9. See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) (describing marriage as “the most 
important relation in life” and “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would 
be neither civilization nor progress”).  
 10. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. 
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recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.11  
Notwithstanding the strong Supreme Court support for the notion 
that the United States Constitution protects the rights of people 
generally to marry and have children, gay people in the United States 
have been and are still systematically denied those basic rights.12 
A.  The Right to Marry 
Many U.S. Supreme Court cases over the years have specifically 
found constitutional support for the liberty to marry. More recent 
than Meyer cited above, but still decades old, is the landmark case, 
Loving v. Virginia.13 While Meyer was decided during the Lochner 
era, Loving was decided in the wake of Lochner and at a time when 
Lochner had been widely discredited. Still, Loving was as clear as 
Meyer in its support of the liberty of people to marry when, in 1967, 
it struck down Virginia’s legislation that made interracial marriage 
illegal.14 Regardless of the rhetoric discrediting Lochner and its 
support of liberty of contract, Loving stands as testimony to the fact 
that the liberty to marry was still guarded dearly in the post-Lochner 
period. 
In Loving, it is disturbing but instructive to note that the trial judge 
was convinced, as a moral and religious matter, that marriage should 
not exist between people from different races. In his opinion he wrote 
unabashedly,  
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and 
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the 
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. at 399. 
 12. See infra Part I.A–C. 
 13. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 14. Id. at 2. 
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such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that 
he did not intend for the races to mix.15 
The ease with which the trial court was able to invoke religion and 
morality as a basis for its decision is shocking. However, many 
modern arguments opposing gay rights to family are similarly 
premised, though perhaps slightly more disguised.16 In overturning 
the trial court’s conclusion, the Supreme Court denounced the trial 
court’s reasoning and again reiterated its support for the general 
liberty interest of people of all kinds to marry: “The freedom to marry 
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential 
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”17  
Ultimately, the Loving Court declared that the prohibition on 
interracial marriage violated both the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution for 
reasons that “reflect the central meaning of those constitutional 
commands.”18 The prohibition violated the Equal Protection Clause 
by impermissibly denying individuals the right to marry the person 
they chose based solely on their racial classifications.19 The Court 
found “patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of 
invidious racial discrimination” to justify the legislation.20 The 
prohibition violated the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause on 
similar but slightly broader grounds—it generally denied individuals 
the basic liberty to marry.21 As the Court put it, “Marriage is one of 
the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and 
survival.”22 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a Woman, 83 
N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1376–77, 1378 (2007) (arguing the legalization of same-sex marriage alters the 
meaning of heterosexual marriage through “the transformative power of inclusion,” and “constitutes a 
very real and dangerous attack upon the institution of conjugal marriage”). 
 17. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. Id. at 12. 
 20. Id. at 11. 
 21. Id. at 12. 
 22. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) and citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 
U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888)). 
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Still other, more recent cases reflect this same strong support for 
the rights of people to marry. In 1978, the Supreme Court decided 
Zablocki v. Redhail,23 striking down a Wisconsin statute requiring 
individuals who have child support obligations to get court 
permission to marry. The Court found the statute to be an 
unconstitutional limitation on the liberty to marry, “reaffirming the 
fundamental character of the right to marry.”24 Still, the Court did 
state that reasonable restrictions on marriage may be imposed 
provided that those restrictions do not significantly interfere with the 
right to marry.25 
In contrast to these cases that illustrate the importance of the right 
to marry in constitutional law jurisprudence, it is well known today 
that many states have enacted legislation and even constitutional 
amendments restricting marriage to a union between one man and 
one woman.26 Thus, no gay couple can enter into a marriage contract 
in those states, despite the strong Supreme Court support for the 
fundamental liberty interest in choosing whether and whom to 
marry.27 Twenty-nine states currently have constitutional provisions 
that restrict marriage to one man and one woman.28 Eleven states 
have statutes that do the same thing.29  
                                                                                                                 
 23. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 378 (1978). 
 24. Id. at 386. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Most recently, Florida and California have enacted such amendments. On November 4, 2008, 
citizens of Florida passed Proposition 2, which amended the Florida constitution to include the 
following language: “Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof 
shall be valid or recognized.” FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27. On the same day, the citizens of California passed 
Proposition 8 pursuant to which a new section (7.5) was added to Article I of the California constitution, 
stating: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
Interestingly, on May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court ruled that the ballot initiative was 
constitutional but that the 18,000 homosexual marriages that pre-dated the constitutional amendment 
would remain valid. See John Schwartz, Ruling Upholds California’s Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A1. In a much watched federal court challenge, California’s Proposition 8 was 
ruled unconstitutional as violative of both equal protection and due process rights. Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 27. For the status of gay marriage in the states, see infra Appendix A: State Marriage and 
Relationship Laws. 
 28. Alabama (2006), Alaska (1998), Arizona (2008), Arkansas (2004), California (2008), Colorado 
(2006), Florida (2008), Georgia (2004), Kansas (2005), Idaho (2006), Kentucky (2004), Louisiana 
(2004), Michigan (2004), Mississippi (2004), Missouri (2004), Montana (2004), Nebraska (2000), 
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On the federal level, in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) pursuant to which no state need recognize a 
marriage from another state other than one that is between one man 
and one woman.30 DOMA also defines marriage on the federal level 
as a union between one man and one woman.31 
By contrast, there are now five states and the District of Columbia 
that have legalized same-sex marriages.32 That number would have 
been six but for the fact that a statute making same-sex marriage legal 
in Maine was repealed through a referendum on November 3, 2009.33 
The statute had been passed just six months earlier. Further, another 
five states have some form of same-sex relationship recognition, in 
the form of either domestic partnerships or civil unions.34 
1.  Cases Supporting the Marriage Ban 
One of the earliest cases to present a constitutional claim of a right 
to gay marriage was Baker v. Nelson in 1971.35 In that case, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that Loving stood for 
limited government intrusions into the right to marry but reasoned 
that the gay marriage ban was completely different from the 
interracial marriage ban and did not merit constitutional protection.36 
                                                                                                                 
Nevada (2002), North Dakota (2004), Ohio (2004), Oklahoma (2004), Oregon (2004), South Carolina 
(2006), South Dakota (2006), Tennessee (2006), Texas (2005), Utah (2004), Virginia (2006), and 
Wisconsin (2006). Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, http://www.hrc.org 
/documents/marriage_prohibitions_2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights 
Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions]. 
 29. Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. 
 30. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 31. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 32. Connecticut (2008), District of Columbia (2010), Iowa (2009), Massachusetts (2004), New 
Hampshire (2010), and Vermont (2009). Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and Other 
Relationship Recognition Laws, http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition 
_Laws_Map.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality]. 
 33. See Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Rebuke May Bring Change in Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
2009, at A25 (describing the results as especially surprising in “Maine, with its libertarian leanings”). 
 34. California (domestic partnerships), District of Columbia (domestic partnerships), Nevada 
(domestic partnerships), New Jersey (civil unions), Oregon (domestic partnerships), and Washington 
(domestic partnerships). Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 32. 
 35. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 36. The court in Baker described the distinction between interracial and same-sex marriage as both 
“commonsense” and “constitutional.” Id. at 187. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, claiming that there 
was no federal question presented and that the issue was one solely of 
state law.37  
There has been a string of subsequent cases regarding gay 
marriage, some citing Baker, that have found, similarly, that there is 
no constitutional right for same-sex marriages.38 Those cases 
routinely provide only rational basis review of the marriage ban, the 
lowest level of judicial scrutiny for legislative regulations.39 In accord 
with rational basis review, legislatures need only have some rational 
basis for passing the regulation.40 The basis need not even be proved 
to be accurate or, for that matter, even be the ultimate reason why the 
regulation was passed. There simply needs to be some rational basis 
for the regulation. Courts upholding a ban on gay marriage have 
typically reasoned that protecting traditional marriage and family is a 
sufficiently rational basis for the ban.41 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 38. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding no fundamental 
right to marry a person of the same-sex); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (finding 
marriage to be a fundamental right, but not same-sex marriage because it is not “deeply rooted”); 
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 976–79 (Wash. 2006) (finding that same-sex marriage is not 
included in the fundamental right to marry because it is not in the state’s history and tradition). 
 39. See, e.g., Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1307–08 (specifically deciding that both DOMA and the 
Florida gay marriage ban warranted only rational basis review, despite the litigants appeal that Lawrence 
dictated a higher level of scrutiny). 
 40. Id. at 1308 (explaining that when rational basis review is being used, the plaintiff has the burden 
of negating every possible basis upon which the legislation might have been passed); Andersen, 138 
P.3d at 980. In Andersen, the plaintiffs claimed that the driving animus behind Washington’s DOMA 
was anti-gay sentiment:  
[Plaintiffs] say that the act’s prime sponsor distributed an article on the House floor 
saying that gays and lesbians are not normal, House Floor Debate at 23 (Wash. Mar. 18, 
1997) (CP at 467), and told the legislature’s only openly gay member that homosexuals 
should be put on a boat and shipped out of the country, House Floor Debate at 40 (Wash. 
Feb. 4, 1998), and that another legislator said that when individuals engage in 
homosexual activity they confirm a “disordered sexual inclination” that is “essentially 
self-indulgent,” House Floor Debate at 44 (Wash. Feb. 4, 1998) (CP at 471). They also 
point to antigay sentiments expressed during legislative committee meetings.   
Id. at 980. Despite these motivations, the Andersen Court went on to reason that there had to be some 
legitimate reasons for passing the act, those reasons being related to the stability of a traditional family. 
Id. at 985. 
 41. See, e.g., id. at 983 (“Under the highly deferential rational basis inquiry, encouraging procreation 
between opposite-sex individuals within the framework of marriage is a legitimate government interest 
furthered by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).  
10
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The federal DOMA was challenged in a California state court in 
the case of Smelt v. United States.42 The U.S. Department of Justice 
filed a motion to dismiss the challenge in that case on June 11, 
2009.43 In the memorandum supporting that motion, the United States 
used traditional reasoning, arguing vehemently that DOMA does not 
violate any provisions of the U.S. Constitution because the ban on 
gay marriage meets rational basis review.44 Smelt v. United States 
was ultimately dismissed on a technicality.  
Recently, DOMA was challenged in two cases in Massachusetts. 
In one of those cases the Commonwealth of Massachusetts itself has 
filed a suit against the federal government.45 In that case, the federal 
district court ruled that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.46 The Tenth Amendment reserves powers to the 
states that are not specifically granted to the federal government. In 
its decision, the district court reasoned that marriage is a matter of 
state law, and therefore the federal government overstepped its 
powers in attempting to define marriage in DOMA.47  
In the other case challenging DOMA in Massachusetts, a gay 
advocacy group, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, sued to 
get federal marriage benefits for seven gay couples and three 
survivors of same-sex spouses who had been married in 
Massachusetts.48 In its opinion on that case, the federal district court 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Smelt v. United States, No. 09-00286 (D. Cent. Cal. S. filed Mar. 9, 2009). 
 43. United States’ Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of 
Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss, Smelt v. United States, No. 09-00286 (D. Cent. Cal. June 
11, 2009). 
 44. Memorandum for the Defendant, Smelt, supra note 43, at 32–37. The case was dismissed on 
August 24, 2009, on technical grounds. Liz Seaton, Despite Court Rejection, A Measure of Progress on 
DOMA, ACS BLOG, (Aug. 25, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.americanconstitutionsociety.org/ 
taxonomy/term/735.   
 45. Complaint, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 09CV11156, 2009 WL 
1995808 (D. Mass. July 8, 2009); Martin Finucane, Mass. Challenges Federal Defense of Marriage Act, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/ 
breaking_news/2009/07/mass_to_challen.html?s_campaign=8315.  
 46. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass. 
2010). 
 47. Id.; Abby Goodnough & John Schwartz, Judge Topples U.S. Rejection of Gay Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A3. 
 48. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010), available at 
www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/2010-07-08-gill-district-court-decision.pdf. 
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ruled that DOMA violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying 
gay, married people the rights afforded to married people generally.49 
While these two rulings represent a tremendous advance in the fight 
to recognize a right for gay people to marry, they are sure to be 
appealed.  
2.  Cases Against the Marriage Ban 
Some recent state court cases have been ardent in their positions 
that bans on gay marriage violate their state constitutions. Among 
those recent cases are cases from the highest courts of Massachusetts 
and California. In Goodrich v. Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that any 
prohibition on gay marriage violated their state constitution’s equal 
protection and due process clauses.50 The Massachusetts court 
declined to find that the restrictions warranted heightened strict 
scrutiny review51 (as discrimination based on race, for example, 
would). Still, even applying the lower rational basis review, the court 
found the justifications for the ban against gay marriage to have no 
rational basis at all. As the court explained, “The Massachusetts 
Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It 
forbids the creation of second-class citizens.”52 The court further 
stated, “That exclusion is incompatible with the constitutional 
principles of respect for individual autonomy and equality under 
law.”53 The restrictions were thus struck down.54 As a result, gay 
marriage is now legal in Massachusetts. 
In California, a more complicated landscape has emerged. In the 
summer of 2008, the Supreme Court of California overturned an 
appellate court decision to uphold a statutory ban on gay marriage in 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 397. 
 50. Goodrich v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). 
 51. Id. (“[W]e conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due 
process or equal protection. Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not 
consider the plaintiffs’ arguments that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.”). 
 52. Id. at 948. 
 53. Id. at 949. 
 54. Id. at 961. 
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California.55 The appellate court had reasoned that (1) the legislature 
had a reasonable interest in promoting the traditional definition of 
marriage, and (2) the legislature had spoken by passing the ban, 
which represented the widely held views of Californians that gay 
marriage should be banned.56 The California Supreme Court rejected 
these arguments and instead applied the heightened strict scrutiny test 
to the discrimination against gay people represented by the marriage 
ban.57 Under strict scrutiny, the marriage ban must have been 
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.58 The California 
Supreme Court could not find the ban on gay marriage necessary or 
at all related to a compelling state interest and struck it down.59  
Nonetheless, Californians were presented with a constitutional 
amendment in November of 2008 to include the ban on gay marriage 
in their state constitution.60 The measure passed, restoring the ban on 
gay marriage that the California Supreme Court had rejected.61 A 
subsequent state court challenge to the constitutional amendment was 
unsuccessful.62 However, the constitutional amendment was 
challenged in federal court in the case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger.63 
The Perry court reversed the law in California again, ruling that 
Proposition 8 violated both the equal protection and due process 
provisions of the Constitution.64  
Even though the California Supreme Court was unsuccessful in 
removing the ban against gay marriage in its state, two other states 
have very recently followed the California Supreme Court’s lead and 
used a heightened degree of scrutiny to find their state’s ban on gay 
                                                                                                                 
 55. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). 
 56. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 718–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 57. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 446. 
 58. Id. at 452. 
 59. Id.  
 60. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the language and effect of the 
constitutional amendment). 
 61. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 
2008, at A1–3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/marriage.html?_r 
=1&scp=6&sq=%22gay+marriage%22+and+california&st=nyt.  
 62. Schwartz, supra note 26. 
 63. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see Eva Conant, The 
Conscience of a Conservative, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 2010, at 46–54. 
 64. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp at 1004. 
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marriage unconstitutional. In 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
found, among other things, that discrimination against gay people 
warrants the intermediate standard of constitutional review and that a 
ban on gay marriage cannot meet that standard.65 Then, in early 2009, 
the Iowa Supreme Court did the same.66 
B.  The Right to Have Children 
There are also a variety of statutes and cases that are specifically 
aimed at the right of gay people to have children. The regulations on 
having children fall into two general categories that correspond with 
avenues for individuals or couples to have children when they are 
unable to have them naturally: adoption and surrogacy.  
1.  Adoption 
Most of the states in the United States have adoption statutes that 
are dictated by proceeding in the “best interests” of the child.67 In 
Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, and Utah, however, the 
best interests of the child have largely been ignored, or subordinated, 
if the intended parents are gay.68  
Florida has witnessed a very recent turn around in what was a 
decided anti-gay adoption environment. In 1977, the Florida 
legislature adopted a statute that made it patently illegal for a gay 
person to enter into an adoption contract notwithstanding any other 
qualifications that person might have as an adoptive parent or the best 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476–82 (Conn. 2008) (“Although we 
acknowledge that many legislators and many of their constituents hold strong personal convictions with 
respect to preserving the traditional concept of marriage as a heterosexual institution, such beliefs, no 
matter how deeply held, do not constitute the exceedingly persuasive justification required to sustain a 
statute that discriminates on the basis of a quasi-suspect classification.”).  
 66. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (“We are firmly convinced the exclusion of 
gay and lesbian people from the institution of civil marriage does not substantially further any important 
governmental objective. The legislature has excluded a historically disfavored class of persons from a 
supremely important civil institution without a constitutionally sufficient justification. There is no 
material fact, genuinely in dispute, that can affect this determination.”). 
 67. Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their Children and 
Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 885 (2000). 
 68. For an outline of the adoption restrictions in the states, see infra Appendix B: State Adoption 
Laws. 
14
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/4
2011] LOCHNER, LAWRENCE, AND LIBERTY  
 
623
interests of the child involved.69 The statute reads simply, “No person 
eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a 
homosexual.”70  
That statute was motivated by a surprisingly clear and expressed 
intention to keep gay people in the closet. One of the senators who 
led the passage of the legislation back in 1977 stated, “We’re trying 
to send a message telling them, ‘We’re really tired of you. We wish 
you’d go back in the closet.’”71  
In the federal circuit court case addressing the Florida ban on gay 
adoption, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & 
Family Services, the federal court accepted the promotion of 
traditional families as a legitimate state interest that was advanced by 
the ban.72 In what could be viewed as a tacit approval of the 
discriminatory intent of the statute, the court then went as far as to 
say that the specified rationale need not have actually been the intent 
of the statute as long as the rationale provides a plausible purpose.73   
In a more recent Florida state court case coming out of Monroe 
County (home to the free-thinkers of Key West), the ban on gay 
adoption was challenged again.74 In that case, the trial court accepted 
                                                                                                                 
 69. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2003), invalidated by In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008). The invalidation of this Florida statute was later reaffirmed by the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals of Florida on September 22, 2010. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption 
of X.X.G., 2010 WL 3655782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Gay Bills Pass Both Chambers, FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville, Fla.), June 1, 1977, at B2. 
Senator Peterson’s remarks were even more extensive and outrageous. He explained in this article that 
“[t]he problem in Florida has been that homosexuals are surfacing to such an extent that they’re 
beginning to aggravate the ordinary folks who have a few rights of their own . . . . They are trying to 
flaunt it.” Id. When asked about the potential difficulty in identifying who is a homosexual when trying 
to enforce the legislation, Senator Peterson responded, “I have no problem knowing what a homosexual 
is . . . and the judge or whoever makes the decision on adoption . . . will [also just] know.” Transcript of 
Senate Floor Debate on SB 354, May 11, 1977 (Sen. Peterson), at 21–22, cited in In re Adoption of Doe, 
2008 WL 5070056, at *10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008). At the same time the adoption ban for gay 
people was being considered, Senator Peterson was also attempting to pass legislation to ensure that 
clothing stores had separate changing rooms for men and women, claiming “[w]e’re trying to stop men 
from trying on women’s clothes . . . it is becoming a real problem in Tallahassee, Lakeland and Miami.” 
Gay Bills Pass Both Chambers, supra note 71, at B2, cited in In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056, 
at *11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008). 
 72. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819. 
 73. Id. at 818 (noting that the burden is on the one attacking the legislation to negate all conceivable 
bases for it, whether or not the basis can be found in the record). 
 74. See In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008). 
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three theories upon which it found the ban on gay adoption to be 
inconsistent with the Florida Constitution.75 First, the court found the 
ban to be a special law pertaining to adoption that is prohibited by the 
Florida Constitution.76 A special law in Florida is one that 
impermissibly classifies people or groups in a way that does not 
relate to the primary purpose of the statute.77 The court found that 
treating gay people uniquely and forbidding them from adopting 
made the statute an impermissible special statute.78 Second, the court 
found the ban to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder, as it acts 
punitively against the people who are forbidden to adopt.79 Third, the 
court reasoned that the legislation usurped the power of the court in 
determining the best interest of the child in a violation of the 
separation of powers that had been spelled out in the Florida 
Constitution.80 These novel arguments allowed the circuit court to 
find, differently from Lofton and earlier Florida state court cases,81 
that the ban on gay adoption was impermissible. 
Yet another recent Florida circuit court case challenged Florida’s 
ban on gay adoption head-on. In that case, coming out of Miami-
Dade County, the court ruled that there was absolutely no rational 
basis for the discrimination against gay people in the Florida adoption 
statute.82 Further, the court stated, citing Lawrence v. Texas,83 that 
morality alone was not a sufficient basis for the ban:84 “[P]ublic 
morality per se, disconnected from any separate legitimate interest, is 
not a legitimate government interest to justify unequal treatment.”85 
On September 22, 2010, the Third District Court of Appeals in 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at *21–23. 
 76. Id. at *21. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at *22. 
 79. Id. at *22, *26. 
 80. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056, at *27–32 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008). The court 
referred to Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Cox v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903, 905 (Fla. 
1995). 
 82. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *25–29 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008). 
 83. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 84. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *29. 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Florida upheld the lower court decision ruling that the adoption ban 
had no rational basis.86   
Mississippi currently still targets gay people, prohibiting adoption 
by gay couples.87 Unlike under the Florida statute, however, it seems 
that single gay people in Mississippi are not specifically prohibited 
from adopting.88  
Michigan and Utah each forbid unmarried couples from adopting 
though single people are allowed to do so. Michigan’s law simply 
makes adoption by unmarried couples illegal.89 Utah also prohibits an 
individual from adopting if that person is cohabitating with a partner 
of either the same or opposite sex and is not married.90  
On November 4, 2008, Arkansas voters approved a ballot measure 
to create a law providing that an individual “cohabitating with a 
sexual partner outside of a [valid] marriage” may not adopt or serve 
as a foster parent.91 This meant gay couples could not jointly petition 
to adopt, and second-parent adoption was also not available to them. 
Single gay people could adopt.92 In April 2010, however, a circuit 
court judge in Pulaski County, Arkansas struck down this adoption 
law, finding that it violated the Arkansas Constitution.93   
In Michigan and Utah (and, until very recently, in Arkansas), a gay 
person living together with a same-sex partner would be prohibited 
from adopting. However, each of those states does allow unmarried 
single people to adopt. Arguably then, a single gay person in those 
states could adopt, but one who is in a committed relationship (with 
more resources and more help for child care) cannot.94 Utah’s statute 
                                                                                                                 
 86. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008). This case was upheld by 
the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida on September 22, 2010. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & 
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 2010 WL 3655782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010). 
 87. Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2004). 
 88. “Any person may be adopted . . . by an unmarried adult or by a married person whose spouse 
joins in the petition.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(4) (2004). 
 89. Single people and married couples may adopt. Unmarried couples may not jointly petition for 
adoption. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.24 (2005).  
 90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (2008). 
 91. Initiated Act 1, 2009 Ark. Acts 14, 14-16 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-301 to -306 (Repl. 
2009)). 
 92. See id. 
 93. Cole v. Arkansas Dep’t Human Servs., No. 60CV-08-14284 (Ark. 6th Cir. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010). 
 94. Id. § 78B-6-117(2)(b). 
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goes further and creates a presumption that it is in the best interests of 
the child to be placed with a married couple and only under 
exceptional enumerated circumstances would that rule be broken.95  
Restrictions such as these on the freedom of individuals to 
structure their own personal life arrangements through contracts and 
thereby to pursue their own vision of a happy and fulfilled life are 
justified as regulations that are meant to promote public welfare.96 
Scholars and litigants alike have attacked such restrictions as 
unconstitutional for violating both the Equal Protection and Due 
Process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in part 
because gay people are generally not part of a group that has 
traditionally been afforded heightened protection under the 
Constitution, the challenges have been met with mixed success.97  
2.  Surrogacy 
Surrogacy arrangements are, for many people, the only way to 
have genetically related children. Surrogacy arrangements have been 
controversial throughout the United States for many years but are 
now legally permitted in about half of the states.98 States that uphold 
surrogacy agreements do so because surrogacy allows people who 
otherwise could not have their own biological children to have and 
enjoy that basic human experience. Still, in certain states where 
surrogacy agreements are permitted and upheld, gay people are 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. § 78B-6-117(4). 
 96. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819–20 (11th Cir. 
2004). In that case, Florida’s ban on gay adoption was challenged. “Florida argues that the statute is 
rationally related to Florida’s interest in furthering the best interests of adopted children by placing them 
in families with married mothers and fathers.” Id. at 818. The court concludes: 
Florida also asserts that the statute is rationally related to its interest in promoting public 
morality both in the context of child rearing and in the context of determining which 
types of households should be accorded legal recognition as families. Appellants respond 
that public morality cannot serve as a legitimate state interest. Because of our conclusion 
that Florida’s interest in promoting married-couple adoption provides a rational basis, it 
is unnecessary for us to resolve the question.  
Id. at 819, n.17. 
 97. A few state decisions have been exceptions to this rule. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 
(Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). These are discussed supra Part I.A.1.  
 98. See infra Appendix C: State Surrogacy Laws Categorized. 
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carved out and categorically forbidden from pursuing this avenue to 
having children.99  
In a surrogacy arrangement, a woman carries a baby for another 
intended parent or parents and relinquishes any claim to custody 
when the child is born. There are two basic forms of surrogacy: 
traditional and gestational.100 In a traditional surrogacy arrangement, 
the surrogate’s egg is used and is fertilized by the sperm provided by 
the intended parent or parents.101 The traditional surrogate then 
carries the baby and, though genetically related to her, relinquishes 
custody pursuant to the surrogacy agreement to the intended parent or 
parents. Alternatively, in a gestational surrogacy, the egg used to 
create the embryo is not the surrogate’s but is provided, as is the 
sperm, by the intended parent or parents. Thus, in a gestational 
surrogacy agreement, the surrogate is not biologically related to the 
child born but is the gestational carrier. 
The availability of surrogacy as an option is much more vital for 
gay men than for gay women. Many gay women are able to use a 
sperm donor and then carry their own biological child—a process that 
is not so easy for gay men. Thus, it is often two gay men who are a 
couple, unable to have a baby by themselves, who enlist the help of 
an egg donor and a surrogate. One of the men uses his sperm to 
fertilize the egg, and the resulting embryo is placed into the 
surrogate. If successful, the surrogate delivers the child, and the gay 
men take custody and become parents, with one of the men being the 
biological father of the child.  
One of the difficulties of surrogacy arrangements is what to do if 
the surrogate refuses to relinquish custody after the birth of the baby. 
Upholding surrogacy agreements (pursuant to which the surrogate 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See infra Part I.B.2.a (describing states that have a marriage requirement as a pre-requisite for a 
binding surrogacy contract). 
 100. See generally Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for 
Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995) (explaining the state statutory schemes for 
surrogacy). 
 101. The terms “traditional” and “gestational” surrogacy are used commonly. See, e.g., Richard F. 
Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to 
Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602, 604 (2002) (advocating for the elimination of a marriage 
restriction on parenthood). 
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had agreed to relinquish custody) has, to some states, seemed like 
upholding a contract whereby the surrogate sells her baby to the 
intended parents for the fees paid under the contract. This form of 
“baby selling” has seemed inappropriate and against public policy in 
many states.102  
The most celebrated case in this area is the case of In re Baby M 
decided in 1988.103 That case involved a traditional surrogacy 
arrangement. After the surrogate decided to violate her surrogacy 
agreement and keep custody of the child, the case went to court to 
consider whether the surrogacy agreement was enforceable.104 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court, in this landmark case, refused to uphold 
the agreement for the very reason specified above, that the 
arrangement seemed like paying for a child and was against the 
public policy of the state of New Jersey.105 The case has become the 
touchstone for debates about the ethics of surrogacy and whether 
such arrangements should be permitted or whether they essentially 
create a market for babies and commodify women in a way that is 
repugnant to modern society and the public policy of the states.106 
More than twenty years have passed since the Baby M case and 
now eighteen states in the United States clearly permit and regulate 
surrogacy, with only eight states clearly making it illegal. In the 
remaining states, the law regarding surrogacy arrangements is 
unclear.107 Advances in technology that make artificial insemination 
safer, more reliable, and more commonplace combined with the 
growing use and demand for surrogacy have pushed states to 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See infra Appendix C: State Surrogacy Laws Categorized. 
 103. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).  
 104. Id. at 1237. 
 105. Id. at 1240. 
 106. For a thoughtful examination of that case, see Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-
Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007). In a very recent case involving 
gestational surrogacy, New Jersey affirmed that surrogacy agreements in that state are against public 
policy and will not be upheld. A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 
2009); Jacob M. Appel, Doubling Down in Baby M: New Jersey’s Ongoing Resistance to Surrogacy, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 3, 2010, http://huffingtonpost.com/jacob-m-appel/doubling-down-in-baby-M-
n_b_409992.html. 
 107. See infra Appendix C: Surrogacy Laws by State. 
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recognize that there is a need and a place for surrogacy in society.108 
The trend toward allowing surrogacy, albeit with safeguards and 
restrictions, seems to indicate that more states will likely move in this 
direction as well. 
a.  States with a Marriage Requirement 
Notwithstanding the widespread availability of surrogacy in the 
United States, some of the states which expressly permit surrogacy, 
including Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, 
and Virginia, have closed off this avenue to unmarried people. Those 
states have all passed legislation to make surrogacy contracts binding 
only if the intended parents are married.109 Thus, in states where gay 
marriage is prohibited (all but one of the states just listed), gay people 
will be unable to avail themselves of surrogacy as an option.  
The marriage requirement for surrogacy contracts was actually 
challenged in 2000 in Florida in Lowe v. Broward County.110 The 
Florida courts were clear. The appellate court declared that gay 
couples in a committed domestic partnership simply are not entitled 
to the same benefits reserved exclusively for married couples under 
Florida state law, including the right to enter into a valid and binding 
surrogacy agreement.111 Despite the clear discrimination recognized 
by the court in this case, the law was vigorously defended and 
upheld.112  
The status of the surrogacy law in New Hampshire will be 
interesting to observe since gay marriage became possible beginning 
in January 2010.113 Thus, the marriage requirement for surrogacy 
contracts in New Hampshire will presumably no longer restrict gay 
                                                                                                                 
 108. This is indicated by the wide number of states that now permit surrogacy agreements to be 
entered into and enforced. See infra Appendix C: Surrogacy Laws by State. 
 109. In addition, there are many other requirements for surrogacy agreements in states that permit 
them. In Florida, for example, the intended mother must be either infertile or at high risk for injuring her 
own or the baby’s life. FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2010). In Utah, the intended parents must be married, but 
there are also additional requirements including that the surrogacy must proceed from assisted 
reproduction and not sexual intercourse. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801(3), (5) (2010).  
 110. Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 111. Id. at 1205. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 32. 
21
Morrissey: Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
630
couples from entering into those contracts. Still, as with the other 
states that insist on marriage as a requirement to enter into a 
surrogacy statute, any single people, gay or otherwise, will be 
foreclosed from this option. Note that these particular statutes 
discriminate not only against gay people but also against all 
unmarried people generally.114 The arguments advanced in this article 
should apply equally to defend against that discrimination as well.115  
The result of the surrogacy legislation in these states that require 
the intended parents to be married is slightly complicated. It is not 
that gay people (or single people) cannot enter into surrogacy 
contracts and proceed to attempt to have biological children through 
that route. It is simply that, if there is a dispute under the contract 
(about the ultimate custody of the child or anything else), the courts 
of those states will not uphold or enforce the surrogacy contract. 
Thus, a single gay person or couple entering into a surrogacy 
arrangement would be risking the surrogate keeping custody of the 
resulting child, despite having agreed not to do so.  
This was exactly the situation presented in the Baby M case. In that 
case, the surrogate decided to breach her agreement to give custody 
of the child to the intended parents. The court was then faced with a 
custody battle between the biological mother who acted as the 
surrogate, and the biological father who had commissioned the 
surrogate’s services. The court ultimately did award custody to the 
biological father (the intended parent under the contract) and not the 
surrogate but did so in accordance with typical custody 
considerations—the best interests of the child—and not with 
deference to the surrogacy agreement.116 Had the surrogate in the 
Baby M case been awarded custody, she also would have had legal 
                                                                                                                 
 114. For an extensive discussion of the detrimental impact of marriage requirements in adoption and 
surrogacy arrangements, see Ann MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A 
Constitutional Problem? The Married Parent Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1991); Richard Storrow, Rescuing Children from the 
Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted 
Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006).  
 115. See Storrow, supra note 114, at 314–31; Jamie L. Zuckerman, Comment, Extreme Makeover—
Surrogacy Edition: Reassessing the Marriage Requirement in Gestational Surrogacy Contracts and the 
Right to Revoke Consent in Traditional Surrogacy Agreements, 32 NOVA L. REV. 661, 676–78 (2008).  
 116. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1555–61 (N.J. 1988). 
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rights to claim child support from the biological father despite having 
intentionally breached her agreement with him.117 
b.  States Without a Marriage Requirement 
There are now eleven states that clearly allow surrogacy regardless 
of whether the intended parent or parents are gay or single.118 Illinois 
passed a progressive surrogacy act in 2005 that is very strong in its 
protection of the liberty of all individuals to enter into surrogacy 
contracts but at the same time very protective of all of the parties 
involved.119 Accordingly, any person can enter into a contract with a 
surrogate as an intended parent and have the contract upheld, 
provided that the arrangement complies with the statute’s 
requirements.120 The safeguards dictated by the statute include 
requirements that protect the health and mental well-being of the 
surrogate.121 Thus, the surrogate must be of a certain age,122 have 
received psychological and legal counseling,123 and cannot be forced 
through a specific performance remedy to be impregnated if she 
decides to breach her contractual promise to proceed as a 
surrogate.124 These safeguards benefit not only the surrogate but also 
the intended parents who can be more certain that the surrogate is 
appropriate for that role and is therefore more likely to fulfill her role 
in accordance with the agreement. 
As the foregoing discussion has shown, strident restrictions still 
abound preventing gay people from marrying and having children, 
just as their heterosexual counterparts can and have throughout 
history. With the few exceptions outlined above (California, Iowa, 
and Connecticut state courts), courts addressing constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 1227. 
 118. See infra Appendix C: Surrogacy Laws by State. 
 119. See generally Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47 (2009) (outlining the 
statutory scheme for surrogacy agreements in Illinois). 
 120. See id. at 47/25. 
 121. Id. at 47/20, 47/50. 
 122. Id. at 47/20(a)(1). 
 123. Id. at 47/20(a)(4), (5). 
 124. Id. at 47/50(b). 
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challenges to these restrictions have used the lowest level of 
constitutional scrutiny to find that the bans are justified.125  
In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas126 
(overturning a Texas law that made homosexual sodomy illegal), 
there is some indication that federal courts could impose a heightened 
level of scrutiny to such cases. That heightened level of scrutiny is 
appropriate; however, it still remains controversial and has yet to be 
fully embraced by any U.S. federal court.127 In the meantime, there 
are still prohibitions and restrictions in the United States, as just 
described, that simply forbid or significantly impede the ability of 
gay people to marry and have children.  
II.  LOCHNERIAN LIBERTY OF CONTRACT AS A BASIS FOR PROTECTING 
LIBERTY GENERALLY 
This article has just described the variety of ways that state 
legislation and constitutional provisions restrict the liberty of gay 
people to enter into arrangements to create families. In that 
discussion, it became apparent that many arguments have been used 
in attempts to protect the liberty interest of gay people in having 
families.128 
                                                                                                                 
 125. This was the case in Lofton, and it continues to be the position of the executive branch of the 
federal government, as reflected in the 2009 Department of Justice memorandum submitted in the case 
challenging DOMA. State courts have largely followed suit, though with some notable exceptions where 
a heightened level of scrutiny was found not to be met by courts in California, Connecticut, and Iowa.  
 126. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 127. For an article making a strong case for such heightened scrutiny, see Evangelos Kostoulas, 
Comment, Ask, Tell, and Be Merry: The Constitutionality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Following 
Lawrence v. Texas and United States v. Marcum, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 565, 585–88 (2007) (stating 
homosexuals as a group have both traits necessary for an application of heightened scrutiny as suggested 
by the Supreme Court). See also Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying 
heightened scrutiny to a claim that the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy violated plaintiff’s right to 
substantive due process).  
 128. Those arguments typically hinge on affording gay people protection from discriminatory 
restrictions under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution or similar provisions of state constitutions. Heightened protection under those clauses 
has typically been reserved for categories of discrimination that relate to race or gender but not sexual 
orientation. As we have seen though, some state courts have applied heightened scrutiny to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Lawrence v. Texas may well represent a heightened level of 
scrutiny on the federal level for sexual orientation. See supra note 127. Arguments based on equal 
protection and due process have been successful in some states (e.g., the marriage cases in California, 
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Despite the intellectual merit of those arguments, the vast majority 
of the states still prevent gay people from marrying,129 and many 
states restrict gay people from entering into contracts to adopt130 or 
entering into surrogacy arrangements.131 These restrictions are often 
the result of historically strong religious and moral sentiments that 
are skeptical of accepting gay people and granting them the same 
rights accorded to heterosexual people. Those sentiments are often set 
forth directly in the opinions on point.132 There are fears of the 
normative consequences of effectively sanctioning gay nature and 
behavior. Nowhere has this been clearer than in statements from 
legislators regarding the adoption ban in Florida specifically stating 
that the legislation was meant to tell gay people to get back in the 
closet.133 Some claim that allowing gay marriage threatens 
heterosexual marriage.134 There are claims that traditional 
relationships must be given primacy and held up as the only truly 
acceptable norm.135 Neither the high divorce rate for traditional 
marriage nor the number of high profile heterosexual politicians and 
celebrities having extra-marital affairs seem to weaken the force of 
these arguments.136 The arguments are filled with religious and moral 
zeal and come in direct conflict with the constitutional arguments 
based on well accepted understandings of the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Furthermore, the traditional framework for analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment has grown to involve a threshold step of 
                                                                                                                 
Connecticut, Iowa, and Massachusetts) but have been more often unsuccessful (e.g., the adoption and 
surrogacy cases coming out of Florida).  
 129. See supra Part I.A. 
 130. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 131. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 132. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 n.17 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
 134. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, supra note 16, at 1376–78. 
 135. Id. at 1377–78; see also Conant, supra note 63. 
 136. “If the country needs any Defense of Marriage Act at this point, it would be to defend 
heterosexual marriage from the right-wing ‘family values’ trinity of Sanford, Ensign, and Vitter 
[referring to Congressmen Sanford, Ensign, and Vitter, each of whom had recently committed adultery, 
with Vitter being identified as a regular client of a prostitution service in Washington D.C.].” Frank 
Rich, 40 Years Later, Still Second-Class Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at WK8.  
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categorizing the type of interest or the category of people involved 
and then applying a level of scrutiny to legislation based on that 
interest or that category. This categorization process has resulted in 
the rights of certain interests and groups getting greater protection 
than the rights of other interests or groups. The existing levels of 
scrutiny have been criticized as creating double (or perhaps even 
triple) standards.  
Under the current paradigm, for example, discrimination against 
gay people typically receives the lowest of the three levels of 
scrutiny, rational basis.137 By contrast, discrimination against women 
receives the intermediate level of scrutiny, while discrimination 
against people based on race receives the highest level of strict 
scrutiny. Further, scholars have posited that the outcome of 
challenges is typically determined by what level of scrutiny is 
applied. The lowest level typically means regulations and 
discrimination will be upheld. The highest level, strict scrutiny, 
typically means that the regulation and discrimination will be struck 
down. The intermediate level, however, is not as clearly predictive. 
Nowhere in the Constitution was such a system devised or 
contemplated.  
As was described in the Introduction, the purpose of this article is 
to reframe the discussion of how civil liberties should be protected 
and to provide another lens through which courts can evaluate 
legislative restrictions. This new framework is somewhat separate 
from the emotional arguments regarding the advancement of gay 
rights on the one hand and the religious and moral arguments used to 
protect the status quo on the other hand. The basis for this new 
framework is economic and even-handed. It does not create the 
double standards or different levels of scrutiny for legislation that 
depend on the issues or groups affected. The framework focuses on 
and defends the liberty of contract of all people. The liberty interest is 
implicated across the full spectrum of life’s many aspects, not 
specifically or only sexual orientation, though that is the focus for 
application here.  
                                                                                                                 
 137. See supra note 39.  
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The central argument upon which this framework is based is that a 
return to the critical scrutiny of all legislative encroachments on 
liberty of contract that was prevalent during the Lochner era is 
warranted, albeit with certain critical modifications. Such an 
analytical framework is a neutral, even-handed, and appropriate tool 
through which legislative restrictions can be evaluated. Neutral is 
used here not as some have used it, meaning protection of the status 
quo,138 but neutral in the sense that it applies equally to all groups and 
issues.  
A.  The Lochner Decision and Framework 
Beginning with the case itself, Lochner v. New York139 was decided 
in 1905 and confronted the constitutionality of legislation limiting the 
number of hours a person could work in a bakery.140 As is well 
known by students and scholars of Constitutional Law, the Lochner 
Court struck down this piece of legislation as an unconstitutional 
limitation on the liberty of individuals to enter into contracts of their 
choosing. Justice Rufus Peckham, writing for the majority of the 
Lochner Court, reiterated a principle that was already found in 
federal and state court cases,141 that “the general right to make a 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 885 (1987) (arguing that 
Lochner can be interpreted as the judiciary attempting to take a neutral position with respect to the 
existing common law in the sense that it did not want to change the status quo, nor did it think it was 
appropriate for it to do so). 
 139. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 140. The limits of the statute were not particularly extreme. The statute mandated that no one work in 
a bakery for more than sixty hours a week or ten hours a day. Id. at 46 n.†. 
 141. Id. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). State court cases have defended the 
liberty of contract. See Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 462 (Ill. 1895) (striking down a statute regulating 
the number of hours a woman could work in any factory or workshop); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 112–15 
(1885) (striking down a statute restricting where tobacco could be manufactured, describing such a 
restriction as an infringement on the right of an individual to earn a living); People v. Marx 2 N.E. 29, 
33, 34 (N.Y. 1885) (ruling unconstitutional an act that prohibited the manufacture of butter substitutes 
and stating “[t]he term ‘liberty,’ as protected by the constitution, is not cramped into a mere freedom 
from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, as by incarceration, but is deemed to embrace the 
right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties”). Interestingly, the language that Justice 
Peckham used in Allgeyer to advance liberty of contract as a constitutional interest was taken verbatim 
from the Jacobs case (though it did not cite to Jacobs) when Allgeyer defined liberty as 
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, 
as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in 
the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and 
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contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution.”142  
The Lochner Court was not without balance in its defense of 
liberty of contract. It went to great lengths to expound upon the 
notion that a state can legitimately interfere with the liberty interest 
of the individual if that interference is within the appropriate police 
powers of the state:143 “The question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, 
reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, 
or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with 
the right of the individual to his personal liberty . . . ?”144 The Court 
was careful to explain that it was not trying to substitute its judgment 
for the legislative judgment of the state but was instead strictly 
assessing the regulation to see if it was appropriately within the 
power of the state to enact.145 
Of course, deciding whether a piece of legislation is within the 
police power of the state mandates defining the police power of the 
state. Without going into much detail, the Lochner Court described 
the traditional police powers of the state as those powers that “relate 
to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.”146 
The Court was wary, however, that any piece of legislation might 
easily be said to relate to such areas, effectively making any state 
legislation immune from challenge under the Constitution. That 
approach, however, would have been out of line with the very notion 
of judicial review enunciated by the infamous Chief Justice John 
Marshall back in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803.147 
Thus, the Lochner Court declared that the standard of review had to 
                                                                                                                 
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood 
or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, 
necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above 
mentioned.  
Allgeyer 165 U.S. at 589. Marx also cited to this language from Jacobs. See Marx, 2 N.E. at 33. 
 142. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). 
 143. Id. at 53–56.  
 144. Id. at 56. 
 145. Id. at 56–57. 
 146. Id. at 53. 
 147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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be more critical and searching of legislative regulations than 
deferential.148 According to the Lochner Court, courts need to 
carefully evaluate any legislative act before allowing it to curtail 
liberty and survive:149 “The act must have a more direct relation, as a 
means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and 
legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with 
the general right of an individual to be free in his person . . . .”150 
Thus, the Lochner Court established a framework for the evaluation 
of whether legislative regulations are permissible under the 
Constitution. Legislative regulations are only allowed to impinge on 
personal liberty of contract if they have a direct relation, as a means 
to an end, which is appropriate and legitimate.  
In evaluating the legislation at issue in the case—the limitation on 
the hours a person could work in a bakery—the Court considered the 
possible justifications for the regulation.151 The Lochner Court 
concluded that the only possible justification was to protect the health 
of the workers involved.152 While not rejecting the notion that the 
health of workers was a legitimate part of the police powers of the 
state, the Court rejected that justification in this case, skeptical of any 
particular hardship that a bakery imposes on individuals.153 Using a 
slippery slope argument, the Court claimed that if such a regulation 
were allowed, regulations setting maximum working hours for 
employees in all fields of work could be set.154 The Court was not 
prepared to accept such regulations. A person “in almost any kind of 
business . . . would . . . come under the power of the legislature, on 
this assumption.”155 The Court viewed the liberty interest of being 
able to work longer hours “to support himself and his family” as a 
liberty interest that the state could not arbitrarily limit.156 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 57–58.  
 151. Id. at 58. 
 152. Id. at 57. 
 153. Id. at 58. 
 154. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59–60 (1905). 
 155. Id. at 59. 
 156. Id.  
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The Court did cite to a case where a regulation setting maximum 
working hours was upheld as Constitutional.157 In that case, however, 
the industries involved were mining and smelting.158 The Court 
highlighted a distinction that in such ultra-hazardous occupations, 
health and public welfare were concerns if employees were left to 
work hours that were too long.159 By contrast, and almost comically, 
the Court described bakeries differently, stating, “Clean and 
wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker works but 
ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week.”160 
B.  Other Cases Decided During the Lochner Era 
The Lochner era is so named because there were a wide variety of 
cases the Supreme Court heard in which it applied this liberty of 
contract framework to determine whether a particular piece of state 
regulatory legislation was constitutional. The Lochner era is always 
said to have begun in 1897 with Allgeyer v. Louisiana,161 a case cited 
to by the majority in Lochner. In Allgeyer, the state of Louisiana 
attempted to criminalize making an insurance contract with an out-of-
state insurer that did not abide by Louisiana laws and regulations.162 
Allgeyer had entered into just such a contract with a New York 
insurer but had done so in the state of New York.163 The only contact 
with Louisiana was a notification that Allgeyer had sent to its New 
York insurer.164 Justice Peckham, the same Justice who later wrote 
for the majority in Lochner, wrote the opinion for the Court in 
Allgeyer and struck down the regulatory action as an unconstitutional 
infringement on the liberty of the Louisiana citizen to enter into the 
insurance contract outside of the state of Louisiana.165 Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54–55. 
 160. Id. at 57. 
 161. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
 162. Id. at 579. 
 163. Id. at 580. 
 164. Id. at 579, 581. 
 165. Id. at 589, 593. 
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Peckham used reasoning similar to that which he later used in 
Lochner:  
The “liberty” mentioned in [the Fourteenth] amendment means, 
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical 
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is 
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the 
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful 
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by 
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for 
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, 
necessary, and essential to his carrying out . . . [those] 
purposes . . . .166 
The Supreme Court continued to follow the liberty of contract 
principles laid out in Allgeyer and Lochner until West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish was decided in 1937.167 In fact, the scholar Benjamin 
Wright wrote in 1942 that 184 cases decided during the Lochner era 
found state legislative regulations unconstitutional as violations of the 
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.168 Those 
statutes involved everything from maximum working hours (as in 
Lochner itself), minimum wage requirements,169 and prohibitions on 
organizing unions,170 to laws requiring children to be raised in 
English-only schools.171  
In 1937, the Supreme Court decided West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish.172 In West Coast Hotel, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a minimum wage law for women and minors. In 
its deferential finding, the Court reasoned that protecting women and 
minors from predatory commercial practices was surely within the 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. at 589. 
 167. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 168. Benjamin F. Wright, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 1942). 
 169. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539 (1923). 
 170. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 4–7 (1915). 
 171. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923). 
 172. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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police powers of the state and in the interest of the welfare of society 
as a whole.173  
West Coast Hotel overruled another Supreme Court opinion from 
just fifteen years earlier, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, which 
followed Lochner and found a statute prescribing a minimum wage 
for women and children to be unconstitutional.174 The West Coast 
Hotel Court found that the economic experience of the intervening 
fifteen or so years warranted renewed consideration of the question 
and a different finding, with more deference to the government 
regulation.175 Perhaps ironically, the Adkins Court rejected the results 
and reasoning of a case decided fifteen years earlier,176 Muller v. 
Oregon.177 Like West Coast Hotel, Muller upheld as constitutional a 
regulation protecting women in the workplace. In Muller, the 
regulation mandated maximum working hours for women.178 
The West Coast Hotel Court spoke disparagingly of the freedom of 
contract trumpeted by the Lochner Court, asking almost facetiously, 
“What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom 
of contract. It speaks of liberty . . . .”179  
Despite its critical tone toward any notion of liberty of contract, 
West Coast Hotel still essentially followed Lochner in the sense that 
it explained that the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment 
surely existed but was subject to the police power of the state.180 It 
was in the application of the Lochner framework that the West Coast 
Hotel Court shifted gears away from Lochner’s critical assessment of 
regulation and toward a more deferential approach that gave latitude 
to the legislature to consider social and economic conditions when 
enacting regulations.  
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. at 397–400. 
 174. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 548. 
 175. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 389–90. 
 176. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 552–53. 
 177. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 178. Id. The statute in question was an Oregon statute that prohibited women from working in 
laundries for more than ten hours per day. 
 179. West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 391. 
 180. Id.  
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The West Coast Hotel Court explained that many states had been 
enacting employment regulations to protect their work forces.181 The 
Court then said, defiantly, “Legislative response to that conviction 
cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious and that is all we have 
to decide.”182 In other words, the West Coast Hotel Court said that as 
long as the state legislature was not being arbitrary or capricious, it 
was acting within its appropriate police power.183 This did indeed 
represent a more deferential standard of review than the more 
rigorous standard outlined in Lochner. 
Shortly after the West Coast Hotel case was decided, the Supreme 
Court put the final nail in the Lochner coffin with the Carolene 
Products184 case, in which it confronted the constitutionality of the 
national Filled Milk Act.185 The Carolene Products Court relied on 
precedent from some twenty years earlier to find that regulating food 
products is clearly within the police powers of the state in protecting 
the health of its citizens.186  
The Carolene Products opinion went on aggressively to state that 
the presumption regarding legislation should be that “it rests upon 
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the 
legislators.”187 Attached to that sentence was the now-famous 
footnote 4. In footnote 4, the Court continued to describe the 
“presumption of constitutionality” that should be accorded 
legislation.188 The Court went on to suggest a heightened degree of 
scrutiny for legislation that “appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth.”189 In this way, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 393. 
 182. Id. at 399. 
 183. Id. 
 184. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 185. The Filled Milk Act prohibited certain milk substitutes from entering interstate commerce. Id. at 
144. 
 186. Id. at 148 (citing Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919) (upholding the constitutionality of an 
Ohio statute that mandated that condensed milk be made from full cream milk)). 
 187. Id. at 152. 
 188. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 189. Id.  
33
Morrissey: Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
642
formally enshrined a new judicial deference to general legislation, 
with potentially heightened scrutiny for legislation that appears to 
specifically violate the Constitution—legislation that might, for 
example, impact freedom of speech or discriminate on the basis of 
race.190  
C.  Criticisms of Lochner 
The Lochner Court itself was divided on how to approach the 
maximum working hours regulation under review in that case.191 
Subsequent cases and scholars have joined with the dissenters in 
decrying the logic and outcome of Lochner and by association the 
other cases that were decided along similar principles. 
Justice Holmes wrote a scathing dissent in Lochner that is often 
quoted by critics of the majority’s opinion.192 Holmes claimed that 
the majority’s decision was enforcing a laissez-faire political 
philosophy upon society and that the Court was not acting within its 
proper power in doing so.193 Holmes went further to suggest that 
Justices in the majority were acting in accord with their preferences 
as if they were legislators and not neutral interpreters of a 
constitution.194 He described a variety of encroachments on the 
liberty of contract that the Justices, were they acting as legislators 
might think injudicious, but which nonetheless rightly were held to 
be constitutional.195  
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices White and Day, dissenting, stated 
that legislation ought to be left undisturbed “unless it be, beyond 
question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative power.”196 
Justice Harlan went on to describe the working conditions of bakers 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257–58 (1931) (showing 
the use of a “presumption of constitutionality” by Justice Louis Brandeis to evaluate state regulations). 
 191. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
 192. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 75 (citing Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606 (1903) (upholding a prohibition on selling stock on 
margin) and Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898) (upholding a maximum eight hour work day for 
miners)).  
 196. Id. at 68. 
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as being particularly brutal and therefore well within the power of the 
New York legislature to regulate:197 “Nearly all bakers are pale faced 
and of more delicate health than the workers of other crafts, which is 
chiefly due to their hard work and their irregular and unnatural mode 
of living . . . .”198 In their dissents, Justices Holmes and Harlan, and 
the other Justices who joined them showed the great deference to 
state legislation that ultimately was echoed by the majority opinions 
in West Coast Hotel and Carolene Products. 
There have been many caustic scholarly commentaries on the 
Lochner decision and its aftermath.199 In 2003 David Strauss wrote 
that “Lochner v. New York would probably win the prize, if there 
were one, for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred 
years.”200 Another scholar recently referred to Lochner as a “bête 
noire of modern constitutional scholarship.”201 Yet another scholar 
described Lochner as, for many years, an established element of the 
anti-canon of constitutional law.202 In other words, it is an opinion 
that was so wrong that it needed to be studied for its place in the 
historical development of the canon of cases that got the law and 
analysis correct. All the more scholarship and debate concerning 
Lochner was generated at the centennial of the decision in 2005.203  
Just as Justices Holmes and Harlan argued, critics have decried the 
Lochner court for substituting a laissez-faire political philosophy for 
the policy preferences of the legislative bodies passing the 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id. at 70–71, 73. 
 198. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 199. For a lengthy listing of scholars who have decried the Lochner case as a glaring example of 
judicial activism and an attempt by those Justices to empower businesses at the expense of the working 
classes, see David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract 
During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 218–19 (2009). Included in that listing are 
such heavy hitters as Roscoe Pound, Learned Hand, Charles Warren, and contemporary scholars such as 
Geoffrey Stone, Jesse Choper, Lawrence Tribe, and Robert Bork. 
 200. David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong? 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003) (footnote 
omitted). 
 201. Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertarian 
Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 840 (2005). 
 202. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 
B.U. L. REV. 677, 682 (2005). 
 203. See, e.g., Symposium, Lochner Centennial Conference, 85 B.U.L. REV. 671 (2005); Symposium, 
The 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 323 
(2005). 
35
Morrissey: Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
644
regulations being reviewed.204 Indeed, the political proclivities of the 
Lochnerian Justices have been routinely described as demonically 
Darwinist; the Justices were aware that their “survival of the fittest” 
decisions favored the ruling class and sacrificed the working class but 
were content with that result.205 This, the scholars argue, was 
inappropriate, indeed inexcusable.206 It was in all of these 
commentaries and the subsequent cases that cited back to Lochner as 
an example of inappropriate judicial political activism that, as 
Professor Howard Gillman expressed it, “Lochner had finally become 
Lochnerized” and became a touchstone for inappropriate judicial 
activism.207 Arguments of this sort were given more credence by 
Justice Holmes’s claim in his dissent that the majority was relying on 
a famous laissez-faire political treatise of the era, Sir Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics.208   
There are also a variety of nuanced critiques of the Lochner 
decision that a mere label of judicial activism does not capture. Some 
argue that Lochner found a constitutional liberty of contract in the 
Fourteenth Amendment where there simply was none.209 While 
“liberty” is mentioned in that clause, “contract” never is. Charles 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 821 (2005) 
(referring to the Lochner Court as “one of the great activist Supreme Courts of U.S. history”).   
 205. For a survey of these arguments, see David Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism Revised: 
Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 n.6 (citing Derrick 
Bell, Loren Beth, Archibald Cox, Robert McCloskey, and others in a fierce condemnation of the 
Lochnerian justices and their support of the wealthier classes at the expense of the poor). 
 206. See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859, 860–61 (2005) 
(discussing but challenging the traditional view of Lochner’s illegitimate policy-making). 
 207. Id. at 861 (citing WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 123–25 (1988)). 
 208. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The 14th 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”). 
 209. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 44–46, 49 (1990) (footnote omitted) (“In his 
1905 Lochner opinion, Justice Peckham, defending liberty from what he conceived to be ‘a mere 
meddlesome interference,’ asked rhetorically, ‘[A]re we all . . . at the mercy of legislative majorities?’ 
The correct answer, where the Constitution is silent, must be ‘yes.’”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18–20 (1980) (arguing that substantive due process is 
an oxymoron and that the demise of Lochner was appropriate); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 574–78 (2nd ed. 1988) (discussing the internal inconsistencies of the application 
of liberty of contract even during the Lochner era); Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 449 (1926) (“Whatever may be pedigree of the Allgeyer 
case definition [of liberty], it is clear that the Court had departed from the original definition of ‘liberty’ 
which prevailed in 1789, and which had been the definition adopted by the State Courts prior to 1868.”).  
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Warren was particularly skeptical of Lochner for having embraced a 
constitutional right to liberty of contract. Warren argued that this 
right was completely out of line with the framers’ notion that liberty 
meant freedom from physical restraint.210 With a similar perspective, 
in its opinion, the West Coast Hotel Court asked the public, “What is 
this freedom?”211  
Cass Sunstein argues that the Lochner decision should be viewed 
as being more than just a case of judicial activism but also a case that 
enshrines the judicial principle of neutrality.212 Sunstein views this 
neutrality as a duty to defend the status quo as defined by the baseline 
of the existing common law.213 According to Sunstein, Lochner 
exemplifies this neutrality principle because the Court defended the 
existing distribution of wealth and entitlement by overriding a 
legislative action attempting to disrupt that balance. The status quo 
being defended is based on the common law that existed at that time, 
which allowed employers to freely contract with employees, 
regardless of whether that may have favored the wealthier classes.214 
Other critics do not focus on whether or not liberty of contract 
exists in the Constitution but rather merely the extent to which it 
should trump social legislation deemed necessary by the majority (as 
reflected in a legislative enactment).215 Those critics find Lochner 
objectionable in its overly-strong defense of that liberty interest and 
in its sacrifice of the majoritarian regulations it defeated.216  
Another, perhaps more palliative, critique was offered by the 
Supreme Court in its opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.217 
That opinion reflected the notion that the Lochner Court was not 
wrong to find a liberty of contract interest in the Constitution nor was 
it wrong to defend the liberty of contract in 1905.218 According to the 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See Warren, supra note 209, at 449–50. 
 211. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
 212. Sunstein, supra note 138, at 874. 
 213. Id.  
 214. See id. at 885. 
 215. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 200, at 376 (describing how judicial review was acceptable only to 
correct significant governmental errors). 
 216. Id.; see also BORK, supra note 209. 
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 218. Id. at 861. 
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Casey Court, at that time the Lochner Court simply was unaware of 
what an unregulated market might mean for social welfare.219 As the 
Casey Court stated, the Lochner line of cases “rested on 
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a 
relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human 
welfare.”220 Awareness of those false assumptions came later as the 
Depression took hold.221 It is only in light of that new awareness that 
more modern courts could understand that regulations on social life 
needed a more deferential constitutional approach.222 
A large part of Lochnerian scholarship has been devoted to the 
attempt to harmonize Lochner’s demise with the rise of other 
unenumerated liberty interests that have since been found in the 
Constitution.223 Criticizing Lochner’s support of a liberty interest 
found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
presents a challenge to scholars who saw the growth of the right of 
privacy and all of the specific case decisions based on that right as a 
positive development. Included in those cases are those concerning 
the right to use contraceptives,224 abortion,225 and even gay rights.226 
In the 1970s, John Hart Ely coined the phrase “Lochnering” in 
relation to the Roe v. Wade227 abortion case to indicate that the Roe 
Court had, like the Lochner Court, based its opinion on rights that 
were simply not present in the Constitution.228 Indeed, Robert Bork 
has argued that if one wishes to support unenumerated rights to 
privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, then one should go “all the 
way” and support Lochner too.229 Bork was not advocating for that 
outcome. Quite the contrary, he was attempting to show why cases 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Id. at 861–62. 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id.  
 222. See also Balkin, supra note 203. 
 223. Bernstein, supra note 205, at 12–13. 
 224. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 225. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 226. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 227. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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overturning restrictive legislation concerning contraception and 
abortion were, like Lochner, inappropriate exercises of judicial 
authority.230 
D.  A Historical Perspective 
The demise of Lochner should also be put into its historical 
context. As much as the philosophy of Lochner itself grew out of the 
ideological underpinnings of the birth of a new nation and the 
reconstruction era, its demise was precipitated by the new economic 
conditions thrust upon a growing nation during the Great Depression.  
Lochner’s basic premise that people should have the liberty to 
structure their own lives free of government interference echoes the 
trumpets of freedom that cried for independence from the 
monarchical social structure of Europe. The Declaration of 
Independence was clear in its guarantees of “life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.”231 Early Supreme Court jurisprudence 
emphasized that the federal courts were designed and empowered by 
the structure of the new nation to review and keep a check on the 
legislative branch of both the federal and state governments.232 Cases 
like Lochner, its predecessor, Allgeyer, and cases decided in the same 
era, like Adkins, all discussed above, reflect this suspicion of 
government intrusions into the liberty of individuals to structure their 
own arrangements and lives.  
As the United States developed, so too did the strength of the 
liberty of contract philosophy. By 1866, that philosophy was 
expressly echoed in the Civil Rights Act passed that year, which gave 
all “citizens, of every race and color, . . . [the] right . . . to make and 
enforce contracts.” 233 Liberty of contract in that era was a metaphor 
                                                                                                                 
 230. Id.  
 231. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 232. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 233. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). For a comprehensive examination of freedom of 
contract as it evolved in antebellum years of the 1800s, see James W. Fox Jr., The Law of Many Faces: 
Antebellum Contract Law Background of Reconstruction-Era Freedom of Contract, 49 AM. J. LEGAL 
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for liberty itself.234 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
complete with its guaranty of “liberty,” was drafted in this context. 
The pressures of the Great Depression, however, saw a call for 
more government intervention. There was growing distrust of the 
managerial classes and suspicion that the working classes were being 
abused and did not have the leverage in contract negotiations to 
represent their own interests adequately. This view was clearly 
manifested in the West Coast Hotel opinion, in which the Court went 
to great lengths to discuss the possibility for abuse of women in the 
workforce and the necessity of government intervention and 
protection:235 “The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an 
unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus 
relatively defenceless [sic] against the denial of a living wage . . . 
casts a direct burden . . . upon the community.”236 
The progressives of the Depression Era rejected the individualism 
espoused by the Lochnerian cases and their promotion of individual 
liberties. Such scholars, politicians, and judges believed that more 
social regulation was appropriate and advocated accordingly. Roscoe 
Pound, Learned Hand, and Charles Warren all criticized Lochnerian 
liberty of contract as going too far in sacrificing public welfare for 
individual interests.237 Amazingly, Learned Hand actually advocated 
amending the Constitution to delete the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as being too powerful in their 
ability to defeat social legislation.238 
President Franklin Roosevelt, upset with the Supreme Court’s 
decisions rejecting regulatory legislation, threatened to change the 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Id. at 61. 
 235. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 236. Id. at 399. 
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 238. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 249 (1994). 
40
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/4
2011] LOCHNER, LAWRENCE, AND LIBERTY  
 
649
make-up of the Court to include twice as many Justices.239 Of course 
Roosevelt would have chosen the new Justices to achieve the results 
from the Court that he wanted. Suddenly, change was in the air, and 
Lochnerian liberty had become a jurisprudential moment of the past, 
replaced by the judicial deference embodied by the rational basis test. 
III.  THE FLAWS OF LOCHNER AND THE SOLUTION: A SHIFTING 
PRESUMPTION 
As Part II just described, by the late 1930s the Lochner framework 
had been discredited, and it continues to be largely out of favor.240 
Many modern scholars continue to echo the writings and sentiments 
of the scholars and judges who criticized Lochner in the early part of 
the twentieth century.241  
Nonetheless, the logic and philosophy underlying the Lochner era 
cases still have great merit. The rulings in those cases rested on the 
notion that there should be a presumption of liberty of contract for 
individuals—allowing individuals to structure their own lives as they 
see fit—and that the government should have some compelling 
reason to interfere with that liberty interest. As Part I indicated, there 
are still many ways in which government regulations restrict 
individual liberty of contract, the focus there being on the liberty of 
gay people to be married and have children. A return to a modified 
version of that Lochnerian framework would help safeguard the 
public against legislation that restricts individual liberty of contract 
and consequentially individual liberty itself.   
This Part will survey some of the neo-Lochnerian scholars who are 
defenders, in some way, of the Lochner decision and framework. It 
will then attempt to crystallize a modified Lochnerian framework that 
can be used by modern courts as a safeguard against encroachments 
                                                                                                                 
 239. It is impossible to resist citing the old adage that grew out of this historical moment, the famous 
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on civil liberties. Finally, it will apply that framework to the 
restrictions on gay rights to family outlined in Part I. 
A.  Recent Scholarship and Case Law Supporting Lochner 
Despite the strong criticism of Lochner over the past 100 years, 
there are a growing number of voices that are recognizing that the 
reaction to Lochner was overblown. Some of these voices suggest a 
Machiavellian attempt by Progressive Era scholars, judges, and 
politicians to demonize Lochner and its focus on individual liberty in 
order to advance a different agenda, one centered on the promotion of 
social legislation.242 
One of the most recent and comprehensive articles rehabilitating 
Lochner is David Mayer’s 2009 article, which criticizes what he 
refers to as the commonly held “myths” about Lochner.243 Mayer 
claims that “the orthodox view is wrong in virtually all its 
assumptions.”244 Mayer employs a historical approach to explain that 
the Lochner majority was not particularly laissez-faire in its 
prevailing ideology but focused on balancing what it perceived were 
historic and well-grounded liberty guarantees against undue intrusion 
by government regulation.245 Mayer points out that if the Lochnerian 
courts were truly laissez-faire in their approach then only those laws 
that prohibit acts which actually harm others or abridge the legitimate 
rights of others rights would have ever passed constitutional 
muster.246 Quite the contrary, one of the major critiques of the 
Lochner era was that so many cases seemed out of line with each 
other.247 As much as there were many cases ruling that legislation 
was unconstitutional as impinging on individuals’ liberty of contract, 
                                                                                                                 
 242. Id. at 219–20 (stating that the progressive critics of Lochner were not at all objective or neutral in 
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 243. Id. at 224. 
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there were others upholding legislative restrictions.248 Mayer is one 
scholar who criticizes the critics, claiming that the Progressive Era 
scholars who defamed Lochner had their own activist agenda 
advocating for a broader governmental role in structuring society.249 
In a 2003 essay entitled, “Why Was Lochner Wrong,” David 
Strauss both criticizes and defends the Lochner Court.250 Strauss 
states that the Lochner Court acted defensibly in finding a liberty of 
contract within the Fourteenth Amendment.251 Strauss points out that 
even after Lochner was “interred” for finding rights not specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution, the Supreme Court continued to do 
so.252 Thus, the problem with the Lochner decision was not that it 
found such a right but that it went too far in defending that right 
against legislation.253 
In 2003, David Bernstein wrote that Lochner should be re-
evaluated as “the progenitor of modern substantive due process cases 
such as Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. 
Texas.”254 This argument reflects the dilemma that some scholars 
have had with Lochner: how to criticize Lochner as inappropriately 
expounding upon unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, while still supporting those later substantive due 
process cases. Bernstein does not so much solve this dilemma as 
point out that it exists, despite the claims of other scholars that 
Lochner should be cordoned off as a case concerned not with 
fundamental liberties, but with an opposition to class legislation.255  
Bernstein states that one of the latest cases to rely on the liberty 
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Lawrence v. 
Texas,256 is the clearest example of a modern court echoing (perhaps 
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 250. Strauss, supra note 200, at 375. 
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 254. Bernstein, supra note 205, at 12–13. 
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even relying on without citation) the analysis set forth in Lochner.257 
Where the earlier fundamental rights cases, like Griswold v. 
Connecticut258 and Roe v. Wade,259 spoke specifically of a right to 
privacy found in the penumbra of rights that are contained in the Bill 
of Rights and incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Lawrence paid no deference to that framework.260 It was simple and 
clear in its approach, like the courts of the Lochner era. It identified a 
liberty interest being curtailed by legislation—the right to intimate 
contact with an adult person of one’s choosing—and asked the state 
to justify that legislation. Finding no satisfactory justification, the 
Lawrence Court ruled that the restriction on liberty in that case 
simply violated the liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.261  
Randy Barnett also discusses the liberty of contract jurisprudence 
of Lochner and its transition into modern Supreme Court opinions.262 
Barnett argues that the liberty interest described in Lochner was 
actually rehabilitated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where the 
Court spoke of a liberty interest and not only of the right to privacy 
found in the penumbra of rights contained in the Bill of Rights.263  
Barnett goes further in his analysis of the Lawrence case than did 
Bernstein. Barnett views the Lawrence Court as not only defending a 
general liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also re-
invigorating the presumption of liberty that the Lochner courts 
employed:264 “[W]ith liberty as the baseline, the majority places the 
onus on the government to justify its statutory restriction.”265 The 
Lawrence Court found no justification for its prohibition on sexual 
intimacy between same-sex partners beyond moral approbation, 
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 261. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
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which was not sufficient to warrant upholding the statute.266 The 
Lawrence Court cited back to the dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, the 
1986 case that upheld a Georgia statute making sodomy illegal for 
any person, stating affirmatively that morality “is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law.”267 The Lawrence Court also quoted from 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 1992 case addressing when 
restrictions on the right to an abortion are constitutional, reaffirming 
that “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our 
own moral code.”268 Barnett goes on to explain that morality alone 
should never be a sufficient justification for a statute lest it forever be 
invoked to immunize legislation from constitutional review.269 
Barnett calls for a “robust ‘presumption of liberty’” to protect 
individual rights across the political spectrum.270 
B.  A Revised Framework with a Shifting Presumption 
As Justice Peckham, who wrote the majority opinion in Lochner, 
might have said, basic notions of liberty are contingent upon liberty 
of contract, without which liberty itself is illusory. The ability to 
enter freely into contracts allows people to achieve their personal 
desired balance of all that life has to offer. Starting with this premise 
and building off of the Lochner opinion and the subsequent 
scholarship of the neo-Lochnerians such as Mayer, Bernstein, and 
Barnett described above, this article advocates a return to the robust 
Lochnerian presumption of liberty. All legislative restrictions on such 
liberty interest should be evaluated critically.   
However, this call for a return to Lochnerian thought and analysis 
is not and should not be thought of as any sort of absolutist bar to 
social legislation that restricts freedom of contract. In addition, it is 
not and should not be considered a call for a laissez-faire approach to 
                                                                                                                 
 266. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582–85. For a thorough and insightful discussion of Lawrence’s 
prohibition on the use of morality as the sole justification for government regulation, see Michael P. 
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 267. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)). 
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government. As discussed above, these have been the primary 
critiques of the Lochner case and its progeny.271 Indeed, Justice 
Holmes, in his famous dissent in Lochner, criticized the majority for 
just that reason.272 He claimed that the majority was adopting a 
laissez-faire social and political theory and foisting that model onto 
the states in a particularly noxious brand of judicial activism that 
overturned much social legislation of the day.273 As scholars are 
beginning to point out, however, that may have been a convenient 
argument with which to rebut the Lochner opinion and its progeny.274 
It may also have been somewhat disingenuous and misleading since 
Lochner itself was careful to explain that appropriate exercises of the 
police power of the state would be upheld.275 
This article agrees with the neo-Lochnerians that the Lochnerian 
model did, and would have continued to, allow for much legislation 
that would encroach on the liberty of contract.276 In fact, it would 
undoubtedly allow for regulations that ban certain contracts all 
together based on their impact on the public welfare (possibilities 
include, for example, gambling, prostitution, or polygamy though this 
article is not taking a position on any of those issues). The legislation 
simply must pass the critical analysis test. According to the Lochner 
Court, restrictions are only allowed to impinge on personal liberty of 
contract if they have a direct relation, as a means to an end, which is 
appropriate and legitimate.277 To state it differently, restrictions 
should be narrowly tailored to achieve an appropriate and legitimate 
goal. To allow too much deference to legislation is to trample on the 
rights of individuals to order their own affairs.278  
As we have seen in Lawrence and elsewhere, a blanket statement 
that the restriction is designed to protect the moral character of the 
populace is insufficient. There must be more. Thus, for the examples 
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previously set forth (gambling, prostitution, or polygamy), the state 
would need to defend the restrictions on a more compelling basis 
than simply immorality. They must, in some way, be detrimental 
enough to the health, for example, or financial well-being of the 
populace to warrant regulatory intrusion on the liberty interest. 
In addition, the proposal set forth here advocates for a 
modification, perhaps simply an explicit nuance, to the Lochnerian 
model that is more easily understood and incorporated in light of the 
development of contract law over the past 100 years. That nuance to 
the basic Lochnerian presumption in favor of liberty of contract is 
that the presumption should shift and run to the benefit of the 
regulation where the regulation can be seen as an attempt to address 
structural or procedural flaws in the very nature of the contracts at 
stake. Thus, where a regulation addresses the fairness of the 
contracting process, the presumption in favor of freedom of contract 
and against the restrictions should shift, and the judiciary should be 
deferential to the regulation itself.  
The very legislation at stake in Lochner, maximum working hours 
for employees, might well have been upheld under this modified 
paradigm. The statute was designed, arguably, to address a drastic 
imbalance in the bargaining power that existed in 1905 between the 
owners of bakeries and their employees. The structural problem with 
the contracting process itself in that context makes the liberty of 
contract at stake in that case illusory. There is no liberty of contract 
for employees who are in a “take it or leave it” situation. Therefore, 
there is no liberty of contract interest to protect. The employees might 
be said to be under economic duress279 and forced to accept whatever 
terms and conditions of employment are handed to them. Where the 
liberty interest is illusory due to some defect in conditions necessary 
to make the consent involved in the contract meaningful, the 
presumption in favor of that liberty interest should shift in favor of 
the regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
 279. Duress is a concept that is much more familiar to contract law scholars in 2009 than it ever could 
have been in 1905.  
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The Lochner case itself failed to describe any sort of shifting 
presumption or to recognize that in certain circumstances the 
theoretical liberty of contract at stake simply does not exist.280 It is 
this oversight, intentional or otherwise, that was the Lochner 
decision’s biggest flaw. Perhaps it was just this oversight that caused 
scholars like Roscoe Pound, when responding to the Lochner era 
jurisprudence, to advocate for more legal realism.281  
The Lochner Court overturned a legislative enactment that was 
designed to help make the bargain involved in the contracts being 
regulated closer to what would be bargained for if the bargain were 
indeed a free one. This notion may well resonate with law and 
economic scholars since the regulations that would be given 
deference are those that attempt to recreate bargains that parties 
would enter into if the bargaining process was truly fair, with consent 
being meaningfully given by both parties. Where parties are able to 
negotiate freely for their own wealth maximizing position, the law 
should not interfere with the parties’ liberty to do so. 
The basis of a contract is always consent, and the true consent of 
the parties involved was at issue in Lochner and many cases 
confronting similar social legislation. The legislature believed that 
the workers (the bakers in the Lochner case) had little ability to 
actually freely bargain or truly consent to the working conditions that 
were thrust upon them.282 The regulation in Lochner, which created 
maximum permitted working hours for the bakers, could be seen as 
an attempt to create contracts that likely would have resulted if the 
parties to those contracts were able to bargain freely and to give 
meaningful consent to the terms of their arrangement.  
Another problem with the historical use of the Lochnerian 
analytical framework and one of the reasons why the framework is 
often criticized is that the doctrine was not applied consistently or, in 
some cases, accurately.283 Thus, far from being uniform in their 
adherence to Lochnerian principles, many cases decided during the 
                                                                                                                 
 280. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45. 
 281. Roscoe Pound, The Call for A Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). 
 282. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 283. See Strauss, supra note 200, at 375–76. 
48
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/4
2011] LOCHNER, LAWRENCE, AND LIBERTY  
 
657
Lochner era were incongruous.284 Certain restrictions on labor 
contracts were allowed to remain, and others were not with no clearly 
principled justification.285 The Court should have articulated the 
standard more clearly, so it could have been applied more easily and 
consistently. Still, intelligent and well-intentioned judges may 
disagree about the outcomes in certain cases where there are close 
calls. Notwithstanding that inevitable result, it is possible to define 
the nuanced Lochnerian framework for analysis clearly and urge 
uniform application of that framework. 
Under the nuanced version of the Lochnerian analysis proposed 
here, the basic presumption is in favor of liberty of contract and 
against regulations that infringe on that liberty. Any regulation 
infringing on that liberty interest would be subject to critical scrutiny. 
In accord with Lochner, regulations are only allowed to impinge on 
personal liberty of contract if they have a direct relation as a means to 
an end, which is appropriate and legitimate.286 However, that 
“robust” presumption in favor of liberty of contract shifts and favors 
upholding the regulation where the regulation is designed to address 
structural or procedural flaws in the contracts involved.  
In attempting to identify regulations that address structural or 
procedural flaws in the contracting process itself, courts should be 
conscious of doctrinal developments in the law of contract that exist 
to safeguard against procedural and substantive unfairness. Included 
in these doctrines are equitable concepts of fraud, misrepresentation, 
lack of capacity, duress, undue influence, and unconscionability. 
These doctrines exist in contract law in effect as ex post regulation. 
They exist to buttress the sanctity and stability of contract and the 
fairness of the resulting bargains that parties enter. Being mindful of 
such doctrines and the susceptibility of contracting to flaws, courts 
should be deferential to restrictions that attempt to correct for such 
                                                                                                                 
 284. See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 at 395. 
 285. In contrast to Lochner, for example, is Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), a case that upheld 
a statute mandating certain maximum working hours for women. The Court in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 
U.S. 426 (1917), upheld a statute mandating maximum working hour for both men and women. 
 286. The language of existing constitutional levels of scrutiny (rational basis, intermediate, or strict) is 
specifically avoided here because this new paradigm is wholly different and avoids the three-levels of 
scrutiny that have been established for Fourteenth Amendment claims.  
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flaws. Such restrictions should be seen as nothing more than ex ante 
equitable measures designed to work in tandem with the 
jurisprudential contract doctrines that are applied in litigation ex post 
to buttress the sanctity and stability of contracting and the fairness of 
the contractual results. The nuanced Lochnerian framework proposed 
here is set forth in the following flow chart.  
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Modified Lochnerian Framework 
for 
Liberty of Contract Analysis 
No 
Is liberty of contract implicated? 
Yes No 
Uphold 
restriction 
Presumption in 
favor of liberty 
interest  
BUT -- does 
restriction 
redress 
contracting 
flaw? 
Presumption in favor of liberty 
interest remains 
Yes 
Shift presumption in favor 
of restriction 
Presumption overcome if the 
regulation has a direct relation to a 
appropriate governmental goal  
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C.  Applying the New Paradigm to Gay Rights to Family 
Applying the intellectual tradition of Lochner and the nuanced 
Lochnerian framework proposed here to the panoply of gay rights to 
family, some regulations that are crucial to protect the contracting 
process would be given deference and likely found to be 
constitutional, but blanket prohibitions on gay people entering into 
certain types of contracts would likely not be upheld. For example, 
regulations affecting the age or capacity of the parties involved in any 
family related contract would likely be upheld. Such regulations 
protect the integrity of the contracting process by ensuring adequate 
capacity of the parties involved. However, regulations that 
completely disenfranchise any group of people from participating in 
contracts that help create families287 would receive critical scrutiny 
and most likely be deemed unconstitutional. This is a new approach 
and demands a more searching analysis of the restrictions at stake 
than the deferential rational basis being used now for regulations that 
burden an individual’s liberty to contract.  
1.  Marriage 
The statutes and state constitutional provisions that ban gay 
marriage would likely be struck down under the new framework. 
Applying the new paradigm requires three logical steps: (1) identify 
whether liberty of contract is at stake; (2) determine whether the 
restriction impermissibly impinges on that liberty interest; in doing 
this there should be a beginning presumption that the restriction is not 
constitutional, and this presumption can be overcome if the restriction 
has a direct relation to an appropriate governmental goal; (3) assess 
whether the restriction is designed to redress some structural or 
procedural flaw in the contract process under consideration; if so, 
then the presumption of unconstitutionality should shift and the 
                                                                                                                 
 287. It may be worth noting that contracts in and of themselves surely do not create families. It is this 
author’s view, just for the sake of clarity, that people create families with or without contracts through 
their personal bonds with other people, related or not. However, certain important legal rights pertaining 
to family are accessible and recognizable only through contract. 
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restriction should be presumed to be constitutional and subjected only 
to a deferential rational basis type of review. 
Ticking through these steps—first, is there a liberty of contract 
interest in the ability to freely enter into a marriage contract? The 
answer is plainly yes. For many years the Supreme Court has 
discussed the primacy of marriage as a fundamental liberty interest. 
Moreover, one of the benefits of the Lochnerian analytical framework 
is moving away from the challenges of characterizing certain liberties 
as fundamental. Regardless of whether there is a fundamental liberty 
interest in marriage as an institution, there is clearly a contract 
involved in marriage. Two people agree with each other to be bound 
together in marriage and all that the institution entails legally, 
including property and inheritance rights. Thus, there is a liberty 
interest in individuals being able to enter into such contracts without 
undue interference from government. 
Second, do the statutory and constitutional bans impermissibly 
impinge on that liberty of contract? As was mentioned above, this test 
is not designed to bar all restrictions on any liberty interest. This test 
starts with the presumption in favor of the liberty interest and against 
the constitutionality of the restriction. That presumption is overcome 
if the restriction has a direct relation, as a means to an end, which is 
appropriate and legitimate.  
Here the outright ban on marriage does not regulate aspects of a 
marriage contract between gay people that are appropriate and within 
the traditional regulatory powers of the state. The ban completely 
takes away the liberty of gay people to get married. Under no 
circumstances is a marriage allowed in states where such activity is 
banned. Recall that morality as a justification for government 
regulatory action should not be enough. Is there another compelling 
reason for a ban on gay marriage? Is the health or financial welfare of 
the population at stake? Again, the answer is no. Some have argued 
that allowing gay marriage hurts or diminishes the sanctity of 
marriage generally. That argument seems to be nothing more than the 
morality argument and should not be given any merit. Accordingly, it 
would seem that such an outright ban on entering into contracts for 
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marriage would not trump the presumption in favor of the liberty 
interest and would not be allowed to stand. 
The analysis is not through until the third question is asked—does 
the restriction represent an attempt to redress some flaws in the 
contracting process? If so, the presumption in favor of the liberty 
interest and against the restrictions should shift. But here, the answer 
is clearly no. While the social legislation at stake in Lochner could be 
seen as an attempt to empower a group that had no contracting 
leverage whatsoever, the ban on gay marriage does no such thing. On 
balance, after applying this three-pronged Lochnerian framework, the 
ban on marriage should fail. 
2.  Adoption 
The analysis is similarly straightforward when it comes to the 
restrictions on gay adoption. This section uses the Florida and Utah 
laws as examples.288 Florida, similar to Mississippi, represents the 
extreme position of an outright ban on gay people adopting, while 
Utah, similar to Arkansas and Michigan, restricts gay couples from 
adopting by stating a preference for married people and prohibiting 
unmarried couples from adopting. 
Turning to the three-pronged test, first, there is certainly a liberty 
of contract interest in entering into contracts for adoption. Again, 
cases throughout the history of the United States enshrine the liberty 
to have and raise children. Once again, however, the Lochnerian 
analysis need not even go that far. For that purpose, it is clear that 
there are contracts involved in the adoption process. Prospective 
parents agree with biological parents, an adoption agency, and/or the 
state to become the legal parents of the child or children involved, 
with all the rights and obligations that such parenthood entails. Those 
prospective parents, therefore, have a liberty of contract interest in 
entering into those contractual arrangements without undue 
government interference.  
                                                                                                                 
 288. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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Of course that liberty is not absolute, and the second step asks 
whether the restrictions in question are reasonable and therefore 
permissible. The presumption is in favor of the liberty interest and 
against the restrictions. That presumption can be overcome if the 
state can show that its restrictions have a direct relation, as a means to 
an end that is appropriate and legitimate. If the restrictions were 
designed to protect the best interests of the child, such restrictions 
would likely be upheld as appropriate and legitimate. With the 
Florida blanket prohibition on gay people adopting regardless of the 
best interests of the child, however, the restrictions go too far in 
limiting the liberty interest at stake.  
Once again, we still have to address the third prong of the test to 
see whether the presumption in favor of the liberty interest should 
shift. Can the gay adoption restriction be seen as a way to redress 
some flaw in the contracting process that is involved with adoption? 
There seems to be no plausible way to answer that question 
affirmatively. Thus, the outright ban on adoption would seem to be 
unconstitutional. 
The Utah standard is more complicated. Recall that in Utah, the 
statutory restrictions call for an adopted child to be placed with a 
married couple if at all possible and not with single people unless 
absolutely necessary. Moreover, the statute forbids couples who live 
together but are unmarried from adopting. This framework involves 
two restrictions that need to be assessed separately. 
The first prong of the test is the same for both restrictions. There is 
a liberty of contract interest involved with entering into contractual 
arrangements to adopt. Thus, there is a presumption that restrictions 
will be unconstitutional unless they can be shown to have a direct 
relation to an appropriate government goal.  
With respect to the strong preference that children be placed with 
married couples instead of singles, this presents a potentially difficult 
case. One can imagine arguments that children’s best interests are 
served by placing them in a home with two parents, rather than just 
one. There are likely to be more resources available for the children 
and more guardians available to care for them. Further, the restriction 
is not an outright ban on single people adopting but rather just a 
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presumption. Thus, even with the restriction, a court could rule that 
an adoption go forward with a single parent, assuming it was in the 
best interests of the child. Thus, this restriction may be allowed to 
pass the critical analysis phase and be upheld as constitutional, 
despite the starting presumption that it is unconstitutional. 
With respect to the ban prohibiting couples that are not married 
from adopting, this restriction is tougher to justify and would likely 
not overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. This restriction 
appears to be nothing more than an outright ban on certain people 
adopting, regardless of what is in the best interests of the child. Such 
an outright ban does not appear to have direct relation to a legitimate 
governmental goal. Indeed, this restriction appears to be motivated 
solely by some sense of morality (that couples living together should 
be heterosexual and married), which the Lawrence case has stated is 
simply impermissible as a justification.289 
Moving to the third prong of the test, with respect to both of these 
restrictions—the preference for married couples over single people 
and the ban on unmarried couples—there seems to be no possible 
explanation that either regulation is attempting to redress structural or 
procedural defects with the contract. Accordingly, the presumption in 
favor of the liberty interest should remain. Still, the preference for 
married couples may be able to overcome that presumption, while the 
outright ban on unmarried couples would likely not. 
3.  Surrogacy 
Surrogacy contracts are likely to get constitutional protection under 
the new analytical framework. Again, applying the three-pronged 
framework, the first question is whether there is a liberty of contract 
interest. Here again, the answer is yes. In addition to the Supreme 
Court for many years expounding upon the fundamentality of the 
liberty interest in having and raising children, surrogacy is an 
arrangement that is created through contract. There are contracts 
between the intended parents and the surrogate, potentially an egg 
                                                                                                                 
 289. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). 
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donor, and perhaps a service that coordinates the surrogacy. Thus, 
there is a liberty of contract interest and, in accordance with the new 
framework being introduced here, a presumption against any 
restrictions.  
The primary restriction that prevents gay people from entering into 
surrogacy contracts is the marriage requirement imposed by many 
states, discussed in Part I.B.2. That restriction would be able to 
overcome the presumption against it if it has a direct relation to an 
appropriate governmental goal. Here, however, the marriage 
requirement essentially forbids gay people categorically from 
engaging in the regulated activity. Once again, if the ban had 
appropriate justifications beyond morality, it might be allowed to 
overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. However, it is 
difficult to conceive of any compelling arguments. The most common 
argument is likely based on a notion that relationships bound by 
marriage are more enduring than those that are not, and thus, almost 
by definition, having married parents is in the best interest of a 
prospective child. However, there is no clear evidence of such a 
claim. Indeed, one of the Florida courts that overturned the gay 
adoption ban went to great lengths to refute such a contention.290 
Thus, once again, the restriction should likely be found 
impermissible.  
Finally, the third prong of the test asks whether the restrictions are 
meant to redress some flaw in the contracts involved with surrogacy. 
There are some limits on surrogacy that can be understood this way. 
For example, the Illinois statute that mandates that the surrogate 
receive both psychological and legal counseling is surely a restriction 
that is designed to make the bargaining process between the surrogate 
and the intended parent(s) a fair one. In that case, the new framework 
for analysis would be deferential to the restriction and likely allow it 
to stand.  
                                                                                                                 
 290. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056 at *15–17 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008) (setting forth 
the testimony of trial experts that having same-sex parents is not in any way detrimental to a child’s 
upbringing). 
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On the other hand, the marriage requirement, which represents a 
blanket prohibition on all single or unmarried people from entering 
into a surrogacy contract, does not in any way seem to redress a 
bargaining imbalance or any problems involved in the relevant 
contracts. Accordingly, that particular restriction would not get the 
benefit of the shifting presumption and would be evaluated critically. 
It should be found to be overreaching and struck down. 
CONCLUSION 
As the quote set forth at the beginning of this article states, 
legislative and constitutional restrictions on liberty of contract are 
generally said to be in the public interest but are often passed for 
other motives. In the case of the restrictions that absolutely prevent 
gay people from marrying, adopting, or having children via a 
surrogate, the rationale seems clear. Just as Senator Peterson said in 
1977, it is a message to gay people to “get back in the closet.”291  
Current arguments that attack the restrictions on gay rights to 
family have had some success, but that success has been limited. The 
states still largely forbid gay marriage, and many states limit the 
ability of gay people to have children through adoption or surrogacy 
arrangements.  
This article has presented a new framework for analysis that might 
be employed by advocates and courts alike. The framework moves 
away from emotional pleas to give gay people the heightened 
protection accorded to victims of gender or racial discrimination. 
Those arguments have been met frequently with skepticism or even 
contempt based on religious or moral convictions that gay behavior 
should not be condoned as a normative matter. The new framework 
offered here turns away from polarizing arguments defending or 
condemning any particular kind of life style or religious position. The 
framework is built off a platform of economic liberty—the liberty of 
contract that was the predominant analytical framework of the 
Lochner era. 
                                                                                                                 
 291. Gay Bills Pass Both Chambers, supra note 71, at B2. 
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This new framework calls for courts to begin with the working 
presumption that the liberty interest should prevail over any attempts 
to curtail it. That presumption can be overcome if the restriction is 
directly related to an appropriate governmental purpose. However, 
the presumption in favor of the liberty interest should shift in favor of 
any regulations that attempt to ensure the integrity of the contract 
involved. If the contract at stake is either structurally or procedurally 
flawed, there should be no deference given to it.  
In accord with this new framework, untold motives based on 
religious or moral convictions will be insufficient to provide 
constitutional cover for regulations and restrictions that infringe on 
liberty of contract. In this way, it is this author’s hope that liberty 
itself can be better protected.   
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APPENDIX A 
STATE MARRIAGE AND RELATIONSHIP LAWS 
 
I. States that have legalized gay marriage:292 
 
California (2010)293 
Connecticut (2008) 
District of Columbia (2010) 
Iowa (2009) 
Massachusetts (2004) 
New Hampshire (2010) 
Vermont (2009) 
 
II. States that have statutes against gay marriage:294 
Delaware 
Hawaii 
Illinois  
Indiana  
Maryland  
Minnesota 
North Carolina 
Pennsylvania 
Washington 
West Virginia  
Wyoming 
 
III. States that have constitutional amendments against gay 
marriage:295 
Alabama (2006) 
Alaska (1998) 
Arizona (2008) 
Arkansas (2004) 
California (2008) 
Colorado (2006)  
                                                                                                                 
 292. Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 32. 
 293. California has been included here as a result of the recent decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 294. Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, supra note 28. 
 295. Id. 
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Florida (2008) 
Georgia (2004) 
Kansas (2005)  
Idaho (2006)  
Kentucky (2004) 
Louisiana (2004) 
Michigan (2004)  
Mississippi (2004) 
Missouri (2004)  
Montana (2004) 
Nebraska (2000)  
Nevada (2002) 
North Dakota (2004) 
Ohio (2004) 
Oklahoma (2004) 
Oregon (2004) 
South Carolina (2006) 
South Dakota (2006) 
Tennessee (2006) 
Texas (2005) 
Utah (2004) 
Virginia (2006)  
Wisconsin (2006) 
 
IV. States that permit civil unions, according some marriage-like 
rights:296 
 
New Jersey  
 
V. States that permit domestic partnerships or civil unions, 
according some marriage like rights:297 
 
Nevada 
Oregon 
Washington  
                                                                                                                 
 296. Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 32. 
 297. Id. 
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APPENDIX B 
STATE ADOPTION LAWS 
 
All states proceed in the best interests of the child with the following 
exceptions: 
 
 
Michigan: no one cohabiting outside of marriage may adopt 
 See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 710.24. 
 
Mississippi: same gender couples may not adopt 
 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5). 
 
Utah: presumption that children should be adopted by 
married people and no one cohabiting outside of 
marriage may adopt 
 See U.C.A. § 78B-6-117. 
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APPENDIX C 
STATE SURROGACY LAWS CATEGORIZED 
 
I. States with surrogacy statutes but marriage requirement: 
 
 Florida  
 Nevada  
 New Hampshire 
 Oklahoma 
 Texas 
 Utah 
 Virginia 
 
II. States with surrogacy statutes where no marriage 
requirement: 
 
 California  
 Connecticut 
 Illinois 
 Kentucky  
 Massachusetts 
 New Jersey 
 New Mexico 
 North Carolina  
 Oregon 
 Washington 
 West Virginia 
 
III. States where surrogacy is illegal: 
 
 Delaware  
 Washington D.C.  
 Indiana 
 Louisiana  
 Michigan  
 Nebraska  
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 New York  
 North Dakota  
 
IV. States where the legal status of surrogacy is unclear: 
 
 Alabama 
 Alaska 
 Arizona  
 Arkansas  
 Colorado 
 Georgia 
 Hawaii 
 Idaho 
 Iowa  
 Kansas  
 Maine 
 Maryland  
 Minnesota  
 Mississippi  
 Missouri 
 Montana 
 Ohio  
 Pennsylvania 
 Rhode Island 
 South Carolina 
 South Dakota 
 Tennessee 
 Vermont  
 Wisconsin 
 Wyoming  
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